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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Petitioner, : 
v. : CaseNo.20050279-SC 
JEFFREY DON IRELAND, : 
Defendant/Respondent. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court granted the State's Petition for Writ of Certiorari from the Utah Court 
of Appeals in State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22, 106 P.3d 753. The court of appeals' 
opinion in Ireland is attached hereto as Addendum A. Jurisdiction is conferred on this 
Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (2002). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue I: "Whether the term 'consumption,' as described by Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-2(1) (dd), includes metabolization of a controlled substance in the human body." 
Order dated June 1, 2005. 
Issue II: "Whether Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (dd) violates the Eighth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution by subjecting 'status criminals' to 
prosecution." Id-
Standard of Review: On certiorari, this Court reviews "the decision of the court of 
appeals and not that of the district court." State v. Markland, 2005 UT 26, f7, 112 P.3d 
l 
507 (quoting State v. Brake, 2004 UT 95,111, 103 P.3d 699). This Court reviews the 
decision of the court of appeals for correctness. Id. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutory provisions are in Addendum B: 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998), 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(l)(dd) (1998); 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-1-201, -202, and 501(3) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF CASE AND FACTS 
On November 3, 2001, the vehicle Mr. Ireland was driving collided with another 
vehicle resulting in the death of its driver. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at %l. Responding 
to the hospital, West Valley Police Officer Buchanan opined that Mr. Ireland was under 
the influence of an analgesic narcotic based on his observations which included Mr. 
Ireland's constricted pupils, droopy eyelids, dry mouth, muscle tremors, and his slow 
speech, and unsteady gait. Id.; R. 77, 185-86. Based on Officer Buchanan's 
observations, a search warrant was obtained to draw Mr. Ireland's blood. Ireland, 2005 
UT App 22 at ^|2. Samples of Mr. Ireland's blood and urine were taken. R. 185. Mr. 
Ireland's blood results were negative for the suspected narcotic analgesics, as well as for 
alcohol and benzodiazepines (Valium-type medications). Id.; R. 185. However, his 
blood sample did test positive for 0.1 mcg/ml methamphetamine and 6 nanograms per 
milliliter of marijuana metabolite. Id.; Exhibit 3. 
Despite the fact that no methamphetamine was found packaged for consumption in 
Mr. Ireland's possession, Mr. Ireland was arrested and charged with unlawful possession 
or use of a controlled substance (Count I), a third degree felony and driving with a 
2 
measurable controlled substance in the body, a class B misdemeanor. Ireland, 2005 UT 
App 22 at ^3. 
At the preliminary hearing, Mr. Ireland argued that because no controlled 
substances were found in his possession, the trial court did not have jurisdiction over 
Count I. R. 83-84. However, the magistrate declined to hear Mr. Ireland's argument and 
bound the case over. R. 83-84. In response to Mr. Ireland's argument, the state filed a 
motion for a pretrial ruling on jurisdiction. R. 83-93. The state argued that even though 
it could not prove where Mr. Ireland ingested the drug, the trial court had jurisdiction 
over Count I "[bjecause a significant quantity of methamphetamine was found in 
defendant's blood, within Utah, it is reasonable to infer that he owned, controlled, 
retained, or ingested the substance within Utah. And ingesting the substance (by 
inhalation, swallowing, or injection) really only began the physiological process of 
"consumption,' which continued so long as the methamphetamine was being metabolized 
in defendant's body." R. 85-86. The trial court agreed with the state and ruled that it had 
jurisdiction over Count I. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at f 4; R. 206-207. 
Subsequently Mr. Ireland, with the agreement of both the state and the trial court, 
entered a conditional guilty plea to both charges, preserving his right to appeal. Ireland, 
2005 UT App 22 at [^4; R. 169-178; 254. Mr. Ireland was sentenced to an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five years on Count I and 180 days on Count 2 to run concurrently 
with Count 1. R. 191-196; 255. 
On appeal, the court of appeals reversed Mr. Ireland's conviction. Ireland, 2005 
UTApp22at1fl. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should affirm the court of appeals' holding because it correctly 
determined that the plain meaning of "consumption" as used within Utah Code Ann. § 
58-37-2 (l)(dd) only describes an act of introducing a substance into the body. The court 
of appeals holding' is consistent with the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of the term 
found within the dictionary and as it has been interpreted in case law from other 
jurisdictions. Furthermore, any other interpretation of "consumption" would create 
absurd results, rendering portions of Utah's statutes superfluous or inoperative. Finally, 
this Court need not review the court of appeals' recognition of potential constitutional 
problems with the state's definition of "consumption" because it is not a holding in this 
case and because the court correctly recognized the implications of defining 
"consumption" as an ongoing metabolization of a substance in the body. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD AFFIRM BECAUSE THE PLAIN 
MEANING OF "CONSUMPTION" AS USED WITHIN UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 58-37-2 (1) (dd) ONLY DESCRIBES AN ACT OF 
INTRODUCING A SUBSTANCE INTO THE BODY. 
In order for Utah to criminally prosecute Mr. Ireland, the trial court had to find 
that the offense of unlawful possession of a controlled substance was "committed either 
wholly or partly within the state." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1 )(a) (1999). Contending 
that Utah had jurisdiction, the state argued in the trial court that "[bjecause a significant 
quantity of methamphetamine was found in defendant's blood, within Utah, it is 
reasonable to infer that he owned, controlled, retained, or ingested the substance within 
4 
Utah." R. 85 (emphasis added). The state theorized that ingesting a substance "really 
only beg[ins] the physiological process of 'consumption,' which continue[s] so long as 
the methamphetamine [is] being metabolized in [the] body." R. 85-86. According to the 
state, "consumption" or "use" is established any time a substance is found in a 
defendant's body because the presence of the substance "naturally supports the inference 
that he had, not long previously, the ability and intent to control it." R. 86. However, 
neither statutory construction, case law, nor dictionary definition supports interpreting the 
plain meaning of the term "consumption" in this manner. Therefore, this Court should 
affirm the court of appeals holding that "consumption" only describes an act of 
introducing a substance into the body. 
The primary goal of this Court when interpreting statutes "is to evince 'the true 
intent and purpose of the Legislature.'" State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123, Tf52, 63 P.3d 621 
(citation omitted). Accordingly, this Court looks to the plain language of the statute 
which provides the Court "with the road map to the statute's meaning . . . . " Id. "[T]he 
plain language of the statute [is read] as a whole, and . . . its provisions [are interpreted]. 
. . in harmony with other statues in the same chapter and related chapters." Miller v. 
Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ^ |17, 66 P.3d 592. The Court's purpose in reading the plain 
language of the statute is "'to render all part. . . relevant and meaningful,' and . . . , 
'presume[s] the legislature used each term advisedly and . . . according to its ordinary 
meaning.'" Maestas, 2002 UT 123 at f52. (citations omitted). In doing so, 
interpretations rendering "portions of the statute superfluous or inoperative" are avoided. 
Id. (citation omitted). 
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Mr. Ireland was convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2)(a). The unlawful possession 
statute is entitled "Prohibited acts - Penalties." Section (2) also begins with the phrase 
"Prohibited acts" and then lists when the "acts" of possession or use of a controlled 
substance violates this statute. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2). Utah Code Ann. §58-37-2 
(1) (dd) then defines "possession or use" as follows: 
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, 
occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from 
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or 
group possession or use of controlled substances . . . . For a person to be a 
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be 
shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but 
it is sufficient if it is shown tha t . . . the controlled substance is found in a 
place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and 
the intent to exercise dominion and control over it. 
Id 
In determining the plain, ordinary, and usual meaning of statutory terms, this 
Court does not look to medical journals or obscure internet sites but instead, "has a long 
history of relying on dictionary definitions." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108, f l 1, 992 P.2d 
986; see also State v. Green, 2005 UT 9, Tf42, 108 P.3d 710 (determine meaning "from 
the ordinary and generally accepted meaning of the statutory language."); Hercules Inc. 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 2000 UT App 372, f9, 21 P.3d 231 ("When a statute fails to define 
a word, we rely on the dictionary to divine the 'usual meaning.111 Citations omitted). The 
term "plain" is defined as "clearly understood," "evident, "obvious," "not complicated, 
"simple," "ordinary." Webster's New World College Dictionary (Webster's) 1100 (4th ed. 
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1999). "Ordinary" is defined as "customary," "usual," "familiar," "common." IcL at 
1015. "Usual" is defined as "common or ordinary use," "most often seen, heard, used." 
Id at 1574. 
Turning to the dictionary definitions for guidance in construing the statute in this 
case, Webster's defines "consume" as "to use up, eat, waste,.. . , to take." Webster's at 
313. "Consumption" is defined as "a consuming or being consumed" and "the amount 
consumed." IcL Black's Law Dictionary does not define "consume" but defines 
"consumption" as "[t]he act of destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way 
that thereby exhausts it." Black's Law Dictionary 254 (Abridged 7th ed. 2000); see also 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at {^10. These definitions illustrate that "consumption" is a 
present tense word, an act that is taking place at the moment a substance is being 
introduced into the body. 
The plain and usual meaning of "consumption" is even more readily apparent 
when it is viewed in context with the other descriptive words surrounding it. 
"Application" is "the act of applying" "the act of putting something to use." Webster's at 
68. "Inhalation" is "the act of inhaling" Id at 734. "Swallow" is defined as "to pass 
(food, drink, etc.) from the mouth through the . . . esophagus into the stomach" and as 
"the act of swallowing." Id. at 1444. "Injection" is "an act or instance of injecting" 
"something injected" "a liquid injected into the body." Id. at 735. 
"[Wjhen . . . asked to define terms found in [Utah's] statutes, [appellate courts] 
often look to other jurisdictions with similar language for guidance." State v. Wanosik, 
2003 UT 46,1J23, 79 P.3d 937. In looking to other jurisdictions' definition of the term 
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"consumption" to divine its plain meaning, the court of appeals noted the following 
states' statutory definition of the term. 
Michigan's impaired driving statute defines "consumed" as "to have eaten, 
drunk, ingested, inhaled, injected, or topically applied, or to have 
performed any combination of those actions, or otherwise introduced into 
the body." Mich. Comp. Laws. § 768.37 (3) (b) (2004). Oregon defines 
"ingest" as "to consume or otherwise deliver a controlled substance into the 
body of a person." Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.984 (3) (c) (2003). And Texas 
defines "human consumption" as "the injection, inhalation, ingestion, or 
application of a substance to or into the body." Tex. Health & Safety Code 
Ann. §481.002 (21) (2004). 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at ^ [13. 
The court of appeals correctly determined that these states' statutory definitions of 
"consumption" offer further support that the plain and usual meaning of the term does not 
suggest that it is the continuous process of a substance being metabolized within the 
body. The court of appeals then turned to case law from this state and other jurisdictions 
for further guidance regarding the plain meaning of the term "consumption." 
In Utah, the court of appeals looked to State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) for guidance. In Sorenson, an officer smelled a "strong odor of alcohol" 
when he stopped the defendant, a minor, for speeding. IdL at 467. The officer asked the 
defendant to blow in his face at which time the officer determined that the alcohol odor 
was coming from the defendant's breath. Id The officer searched the defendant's 
vehicle but did not find any alcohol or empty containers. Id. The officer did not 
administer a field sobriety test or an intoxilyzer test but arrested the defendant, after he 
became belligerent, for "'possession' of an alcoholic beverage by a minor in violation of 
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[Utah Code Ann.]§ 32A-12-13(1), which prohibits the purchase, possession, or 
consumption of alcohol by a person under the age of 21."1 Id. 
At trial, the only evidence the state offered was the officer's opinion that Sorenson 
was under the influence of alcohol. Id. The officer testified that "he did not know when 
or where the alcohol had been consumed, nor did he actually see [the defendant] 
consume, purchase or possess any alcohol." Id. The defendant never argued that he did 
not consume alcohol, in fact, the state's claim that Sorenson had consumed alcohol was 
not u[]contradicted" by the defendant. Id Instead, Sorenson argued that the state had to 
prove that he "consumed alcohol within the state" and the court could not rely on the 
state's theory that "there exists a presumption that consumption occurred in Utah unless 
rebutted by other credible evidence." Id Therefore, the issue in Sorenson was whether, 
absent any tangible evidence of alcohol in the vehicle, the defendant could be convicted 
of possessing or consuming alcohol. Id 
The state argued that "while it did not know where the offense occurred, there 
exists a presumption that consumption occurred within Utah unless rebutted by other 
credible evidence." Id. The trial court agreed with the state's theory that unless the 
defendant offered some explanation that the alcohol was not consumed in Utah it 
"created an inference that the drinking occurred near the scene of the arrest." Id. Based 
on the trial court's reasoning that the "natural inference" and "statistical probability" that 
*Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-13(1) was renumbered to Utah Code Ann. § 32A-12-209 
(Supp. 2003) and contains only minor changes. 
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"the drinking occurred in or about the area where the arrest occurred," the trial court 
found the defendant guilty. Id. at 468. 
The defendant appealed arguing, inter alia, that the trial court's inferences and 
presumptions regarding the location of consumption improperly shifted the burden of 
proof on the issue of jurisdiction to the defendant violating his due process rights. Id. 
The court of appeals agreed stating, "The use of any mandatory rebuttable presumption 
which 'requires the jury to find the presumed element unless the defendant persuades the 
jury that such a finding is unwarranted5 is one such evidentiary device found to be 
unconstitutional." Id. at 469 (quoting Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307, 314 n.2 (1985)). 
The court determined that the defendant's conviction under the consumption theory 
"necessarily requires proof of the jurisdictional factor that at least some alcohol was 
consumed in Utah." Id. at 470. Instead, the state "put on absolutely no evidence of 
jurisdiction but relied instead entirely on the presumption that the consumption of alcohol 
occurred within the state." Id. The court of appeals held that the presumption or 
assumption used by the trial court that "Sorenson's failure to offer some explanation that 
the alcohol was not consumed in Utah created an inference that the drinking occurred 
near the scene of arrest" relieved the state of its burden to show jurisdiction in violation 
of due process. Id. at 467. 
Furthermore, although the Sorenson court determined it need not address whether 
the presence of alcohol in Sorenson's bloodstream constituted possession, the Sorenson 
court "agreed with the trial court's finding 'that the mere presence of alcohol on the 
breath or in the bloodstream does not constitute possession under the statute." Id. at 466. 
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The court noted that "this position is consistent with well-reasoned decisions from other 
jurisdictions which have addressed the issue." Id. at 468 n.2. 
These cases cited by the Sorenson court from other jurisdictions and referred to by 
the Ireland court addressed whether a substance can be "used" or "consumed" after it has 
been assimilated into the body. In State v. Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d 208 (Kan. 1983), the 
Supreme Court of Kansas addressed the issue of whether a defendant could be charged 
with possession of a controlled substance based entirely on positive blood tests for an 
illegal substance. Id. In Flinchpaugh, the defendant was involved in an automobile 
accident which resulted in the death of the driver of the other car. Id. at 209-210. While 
at the hospital, the defendant consented to having her blood drawn which tested positive 
for cocaine and/or benzoylecgonine. Id. at 210. Although the state did not have any 
evidence of how, where, or when the substance was "introduced into the defendant's 
system," it charged her with possession. Id. The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion to dismiss stating "'[a] human being does not possess a narcotic drug which is 
located in his bloodstream.'" Id at 210. On appeal, the supreme court agreed, 
determining that the ordinary meaning of "possession" does not include a substance 
found entirely in the bloodstream. The court concluded that: 
Once a controlled substance is within a person's system, the power of the 
person to control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an end. The 
drug is assimilated by the body. The ability to control the drug is beyond 
human capabilities. . . . 
Id at 211 (emphasis added). 
l l 
Although the Kansas statute did not prohibit the uuse" of a controlled substance, 
the Ireland court found the court's conclusion that "[o]nce a controlled substance is 
within a person's system, the power of the person to . . . use . . . is at an end" instructive. 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at Tfl5 (quoting Flinchpaugh, 659 P.2d at 211). 
Similarly, in State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986) superceded by statute 
on other grounds, the Supreme Court of Washington concluded that "consume" and 
"possess" "do not include the stage at which [a substance] has already been swallowed 
but is still being assimilated by the body." Id. at 76. In Hornaday, the defendant, a 
minor, was charged with illegal consumption or possession of alcohol, and resisting 
arrest. Id at 73. The defendant argued that he could not be guilty of illegal consumption 
or possession because the arresting officer did not observe him do either. Id. The trial 
court, denying defendant's motion to dismiss, concluded "that the defendant 'was 
intoxicated and therefore was in possession of liquor because it was in his body.'" Id 
On appeal, the defendant argued that "his arrest for illegal consumption or possession of 
alcohol was unlawful because . . . the alleged commission of the misdemeanor did not 
occur 'in the presence' of the arresting officer." Id.2 
The state first argued that the defendant's arrest was lawful because alcohol was in 
the defendant's system, therefore, defendant was in possession of the alcohol in the 
presence of the officer. Id at 76. The supreme court noted that "[wjhether the crime 
2Although this appeal concerned whether the defendant was violating the underage 
drinking statute in the presence of the arresting officer by having alcohol in his body 
thereby making his arrest lawful, the court's detailed analysis and interpretation of the 
terms "possession" and "consume" are directly applicable to the issue in this case. 
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occurred 'in the presence of the officer turns on the meaning of the words 'possession' 
and 'consume' as used in [Wash. Rev. Code] § 66.44.270.3" Id. at 74. Quickly disposing 
of the state's first theory, the supreme court stated that like narcotics, once alcohol "is 
within a person's system, the power of a person to control, possess, use or dispose of it is 
at an end. The drug is assimilated by the body. The essential element of control is 
absent." Id at 75 (emphasis added). 
Next, the state argued "that consumption is an ongoing process and therefore, as 
long as alcohol remained in the defendant's bloodstream, it was in the process of being 
consumed." Id. at 76. "Consume" is defined under Washington statute as "the putting 
of liquor to any use, whether by drinking or otherwise." Id The supreme court 
determined that the statutory definition of "consume" was not helpful in resolving 
"whether consuming liquor includes the assimilation of alcohol which occurs after the 
liquor has been swallowed." Id Therefore, the court "turned to the common definition 
of the word [consume] to interpret its meaning." Id. The court noted that the state's 
interpretation was not within the common definition of the term consume. Id Further, 
the court reasoned that such an interpretation would subject a minor to arrest in 
Washington anytime he enters the state "with any trace of liquor still present in his 
body." Id at 77. Thus, although he did not drink any intoxicating liquor within the state, 
he might still be subject to arrest for "consuming" liquor in the presence of a police 
officer who happened to notice his condition or who smelled alcohol on his breath." Id. 
3Wash. Rev. Code § 66.44.270 states in part, "It is unlawful for any person under the age 
of twenty-one years to acquire or have in his possession or consume any liquor . . . . " 
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In State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), the Minnesota 
Court of Appeals also rejected interpreting "consumption" as a continuing offense so 
long as the substance remains in the body. Id. In Abu-ShanaK the defendant was 
convicted of consumption of alcohol by a minor. Id. at 558.4 At trial, the state presented 
evidence that the defendant was under 21 years of age and evidence of the odor of 
alcohol on the defendant's breath. Id. at 559. However, the state had no evidence that 
the defendant had been drinking within any Minnesota county. IcL The state argued that 
consumption should be treated "as a continuing offense because as long as alcohol 
remains in the system of a minor, the minor continues to 'consume' alcohol, in violation 
of the statute." IcL Rejecting the state's argument, the court of appeals noted that "a 
continuing offense most commonly arises in response to a statute of limitations defense" 
citing to examples of such cases as possession of firearms or illegal possession of 
property. Id. at 559. The court reasoned that 
[t]hese [types of cases] suggest that in a "continuing offense" the status of a 
person or object, rather than the occurrence of a single, time-limited act, 
determines whether a crime has been or is being committed. A continuing 
offense is one which can be committed over an extended period of time. It 
is the nature of the crime itself which distinguishes a "continuing" offense 
from one which may said to be "completed," such as an assault. 
Id 
Noting the rejection of similar arguments in Hornaday and Sorenson, the 
Minnesota Court of Appeals concluded that "'consume,' in the context of alcoholic 
4The defendant was convicted under Minn. Stat. § 340A.503 (1988), which states in part 
"Consumption. It is unlawful for any: (2) person under the age of 21 to consume any 
alcohol beverages . . . . " See State v. Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557, 558 (Minn. 1989). 
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beverages, means to drink, and that once drunk, alcohol is no longer being consumed." 
Abu-Shanab, 448 N.W.2d at 559. This reasoning applies with equal force to other 
substances "consumed." 
The reasoning of these courts illustrates that the ordinary and usual meaning of the 
term "consumption" is the initial act of introducing a substance into the body and that 
once an individual has eaten his sandwich or has drunk his coffee he is not still 
consuming his lunch or beverage an hour later because his body is in the process of 
digesting it. Moreover, interpreting "consumption" under Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
2(l)(dd), to include a substance being metabolized in the blood without proof of 
possession or use at a particular time and place would relieve "the state of its burden of 
proof on the fact of jurisdiction and [would be] unconstitutional under the standard 
articulated in In re Winship, [397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068, 1072-1073, (1970)] 
requiring the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime charged." Sorenson, 758 P.2d at 469 (noting that although 
jurisdiction is not an element of the offense, the Winship rule "is not limited to those 
facts essential to establish the elements of the offense [as defined by statute]"). 
Finally, this Court should affirm the court of appeals' holding because any other 
interpretation of "consumption" would create absurd results. The legislature has 
demonstrated that it knows the language to use to criminalize the metabolizing of a 
substance in the body and this language is not present in the unlawful possession or use 
statute. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at ^12 (citing statutes using the term "metabolite" in 
connection with controlled substances). Interpreting "consumption" as an ongoing 
metabolic process would subject individuals engaged in less serious behavior than 
driving under the influence or endangering others to harsher punishment. 
For example, the intoxication and DUI statutes clearly manifest the Legislature's 
intent to punish a condition or behavior resulting from having a controlled substance 
metabolizing in the body. See Utah Code Ann. §§76-9-701, 41-6-44.6. If the term 
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"consumption" were interpreted to mean the metabolizing of a substance in the body, 
Utah's possession statute, a felony, would become a lesser- included offense of Utah's 
Driving Under the Influence (DUI) and Intoxication statute, misdemeanors. See Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 76-9-701; 41-6-44; see also, Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at 1ffl26-27 (Thome, 
J. concurring). As effectively pointed out by Judge Thome's concurrence, 
Under the [s]tate's view, the penalties associated with the dangers posed by 
drug use are stood on their head. A pedestrian arrested with a controlled 
substance in their blood ~ regardless of their activities at the time of the 
arrest - would be subject to a greater penalty than someone arrested for 
driving with a measurable amount of a controlled substance in their blood. 
See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (2003); 41-6-44 (2) (a) (ii) 
(1998). The [s]tate argues that the legislature intended this result and that 
the legislature has the right and the authority to make this distinction. I 
agree that the legislature has both the right and the authority. But, in the 
absence of an express legislative statement supporting the State's position, 
we should avoid drawing problematic conclusions. 
Here, adopting the [s]tate's position would lead to the absurd result that the 
unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a felony, would 
become a lesser-included offense of driving with any measurable amount of 
a controlled substance in the blood, a misdemeanor. Moreover, in those 
cases not involving a vehicle, the [s]tate's position amounts to imposing a 
greater penalty upon a sleeping, standing, or walking defendant who is in 
possession through presence in the blood, than upon a driver who is 
actively endangering others by operating a potentially deadly vehicle with a 
measurable amount of a controlled substance in the blood. Driving under 
the influence of alcohol or drugs creates a grave public safety concern, and 
the mayhem that results from it is one that the legislature clearly intends to 
punish harshly. It makes little sense to treat an offender who has prohibited 
drugs in his bloodstream less seriously if he moves behind the wheel of a 
vehicle, than if he merely chooses to walk to his destination. Adopting the 
[s]tate's position would create just such a result. 
Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at ^[26-27 (citations, quotations, and footnote omitted). 
Furthermore, adoption of the state's definition of "consumption" would render 
portions of Utah's intoxication statute superfluous or inoperative. Utah Code Ann. § 76-
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9-701 (2003). Section 76-9-701 (1) states in part that "[a] person is guilty of intoxication 
if he is under the influence of. . . a controlled substance . . . to a degree that the person 
may endanger himself or another, in a public place or in a private place where he 
unreasonably disturbs other persons. Id A violation of the intoxication statute is a class 
C misdemeanor. IdL at § 76-9-701 (5). Under the state's position, possession or use of a 
controlled substance would also become a lesser included offense of intoxication. It 
would also subject a person who is not involved in behavior that is "endanger[ing] 
himself or another" to a greater penalty than a person who was actively engaging is such 
behavior. Such a result is absurd and makes little sense. 
Instead, the Legislature, by using the terms application, inhalation, swallowing, 
injection, or consumption intended to punish an act, the act of introducing a substance 
into the body. The court of appeals correctly held that the plain meaning of 
"consumption" only "describes] the introduction of a substance into the body, and not an 
ongoing metabolic process." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at f 11. This holding is consistent 
with the commonly accepted meaning of the term found by other state's interpreting the 
term, as well as, dictionary definitions, and the other terms within the statute surrounding 
"consumption" that describe how substances are introduced into the body. 
II. THIS COURT NEED NOT REVIEW THE COURT OF APPEALS' 
RECOGNITION OF POTENTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS 
WITH THE STATE'S DEFINITION OF "CONSUMPTION" 
BECAUSE IT IS NOT A HOLDING IN THIS CASE AND BECAUSE 
THE COURT CORRECTLY RECOGNIZED THE IMPLICATIONS 
OF DEFINING "CONSUMPTION" ACCORDING TO THE STATE. 
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It is not necessary for this Court to review the court of appeal's recognition, but 
not holding, of the potential problem with interpreting "consumption" as an ongoing 
metabolization of a substance in the body as potentially subjecting "status criminals" to 
continuous guilt in violation of the Eighth Amendment. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at {^20. 
The court's one sentence mention of the potential problem of subjecting "status 
criminals" to continuous guilt if "consumption" was interpreted according to the state's 
definition was made merely to add further support for its conclusion that "consumption," 
as used within the statute, only referred to "a method of introducing a substance into the 
body," and was not an issue decided by the court. Id. at ^ [19. 
The issue before the court of appeals was whether the term "'consumption' as 
used under section 58-37-2 (1) (dd) includes "a substance being metabolized in the 
body." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at f 5. As outlined above, the court correctly interpreted 
the term "consumption" according to its plain meaning and avoided creating absurdities 
within the code by concluding that "consumption" describes the introduction of a 
substance into the body. Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at fflfl 1, 23. Therefore, because the 
court of appeals reference to the potential of an Eighth Amendment violation under the 
state's interpretation was not a holding in the case, it is not necessary for this Court to 
reach the issue. Nevertheless, should this Court decide to reach the issue of whether 
interpreting the term "consumption" as including a substance metabolizing in the body 
would subject "status criminal" to prosecution in violation of the Eighth Amendment, this 
Court should hold that it does. 
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The Eighth Amendment of the United States Constitution applicable to the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment provides, "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor 
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted." U.S. Const, 
amend. VIII. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962), the United States Supreme 
Court held that California's statute making it a misdemeanor for a person to "be addicted 
to the use of narcotics" "for which the offender may be prosecuted 'at any time before he 
reforms,' whether or not he has ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State and 
whether or not he has been guilty of any antisocial behavior there" violated the Eighth 
and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 660, 666- 67. 
The Supreme Court noted that "[i]t would be possible to construe the statute under 
which the appellant was convicted as one which is operative only upon proof of the 
actual use of narcotics within the State's jurisdiction^ b]ut the California courts have not 
so construed this law. Id. at 665. Instead, "the jury were instructed that they could 
convict [appellant] even if they disbelieved" the evidence presented that "the appellant 
had used narcotics in Los Angeles." Id. Based on the way the California courts have 
interpreted the statute, the Supreme Court concluded that the statute "is not one which 
punishes a person for the use of narcotics [within the state], for their purchase, sale or 
possession, or for antisocial or disorderly behavior resulting from their administration" 
but one "which makes the 'status' of narcotic addiction a criminal offense." Id. 
Clarifying the holding of Robinson, the Supreme Court, in Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 
514, 533-35 (1968), explained that "[t]he entire thrust of Robinson's interpretation of the 
Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause is that criminal penalties may be inflicted only if 
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the accused has committed some act, has engaged in some behavior, which society has an 
interest in preventing, or perhaps in historical common law terms, has committed some 
actus reus." Id. 
The Supreme Court's recognition that California's statute could have been 
construed as "operative" if it had been interpreted as requiring "proof of actual use of 
narcotics within the State's jurisdiction" and its specific holding "that a state law which 
imprisons a person thus afflicted as a criminal, even though he has never touched any 
narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of any irregular behavior there, inflicts a 
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment" [Robinson, 370 
U.S. at 666-67] supports the court of appeals' holding that "consumption" does not 
include "an ongoing metabolic process" Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at ^ 11, 19. The 
court of appeals' holding is further supported by the Supreme Court's clarification that 
the statute in Robinson was unconstitutional as interpreted by the California courts 
because it punished a condition without any reference to any acts committed within the 
State. See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533-35. 
The court of appeals recognized the far reaching implications of defining 
"consumption" as an ongoing metabolizing of a substance in the body. See Ireland, 2005 
UT App 22 at f^ 20 (noting a contrary holding would subject "'status criminals' . . . to 
continuous guilt for . . . use of a controlled substance, 'whether or not [they had] ever 
used . . . any narcotics within the State.'" (quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666)). The 
court of appeals noted that with improved drug testing the state's definition "could 
subject individuals to prosecution who used drugs months or even years prior because of 
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the substance's continued presence in their bodies." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at f^ 20. 
To interpret "consumption" in such a way would be to interpret Utah's possession statute 
akin to how the California court interpreted the statute at issue in Robinson, making the 
status of having a substance's continued presence in the body a crime without reference 
to any act committed by an individual within the State. 
The NHTSA study cited by the state justifies the court of appeals' concern that 
individuals who simply have a substance still detectable in their bodies long after they 
had ingested drugs and no longer experience the "intended and/or adverse effects" would 
still be subjected to prosecution within Utah.5 Respondent's Opening Brief 18. For 
example, the NHTSA study on Marijuana indicates that "[djetection of total THC 
metabolites in urine . . . only indicates prior THC exposure. Detection time is well past 
the window of intoxication and impairment." Dr. Fiona Couper, Ph.D, ET AL, U.S. 
5
 Even the state recognized this problem when reviewing this case for prosecution in a 
memorandum from one prosecutor to another which was made part of the record. The 
memorandum states: 
The blood was positive for 0.1 mcg/ml methamphetamine. Blood and urine 
were positive for THC metabolite (inactive), which can remain in the 
system long after actual use of marijuana.. . . 
We independently asked Dr. Caravati of Poison Control and Terry 
Lamoreoux of State Tox. Lab about the meth level. Both experts state that 
there is no reliable way to "back-extrapolate" the 0.1 meth level to the time 
of the crash: the metabolism rate is too variable. A "therapeutic" level for 
meth would be 0.02 to 0.09; however, the 0.1 level is not per se proof of 
impairment. Determination of impairment would depend upon the 
suspect's drug use pattern (chronic or acute), time of does, drug tolerance, 
and driving/behavioral observations. 
R. 185; see also Addendum C. 
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Dep't of Transportation: Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Drugs and Human 
Performance Fact Sheets - Cannabis/Marijuana (visited August 17, 2005) 
<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/job 185drugs/cannabis.htm>. See 
Addendum D; see also Addendum C. Positive urine tests generally indicate prior use 
anywhere from 1 to 3 days; "however, the detection window could be significantly longer 
following heavy, chronic use." Id In addition, positive urine results for "[l]ow 
concentrations of THC have also been measured in over-the-counter hemp oil products." 
Id. The study also warns that "[i]t is inadvisable to try and predict effects based on blood 
THC concentrations alone, and currently impossible to predict specific effects based on 
THC-COOH concentrations." Id. This is because "[concentration of parent drug and 
metabolite are very dependent on pattern of use as well as dose." I<i In fact, "it is 
possible for a person to be affected by marijuana use with concentrations of THC in their 
blood below the limit of detection of the method." Id. 
Similarly, the NHTSA study on Cocaine that "very low concentrations of cocaine 
may be detected in urine during the initial few hours, however, benzoylecgonine [a 
cocaine metabolite] persists in urine at detectable concentrations for 2-4 days." Dr. Fiona 
Couper, Ph.D, ET AL, U.S. Dep't of Transportation: Nat'l Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets - Cocaine (visited August 
17, 2005) <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/jobl85drugs/cocain.htm>. 
See Addendum E. But for individuals who may engage in chronic or heavy use of 
cocaine, "detectable amounts of benzoylecgonine in urine [can occur] for up to 10 days 
following a binge." Id. However, the study indicates that after oral ingestion which the 
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"effects onset more slowly" generally the longest duration of the effects of cocaine "will 
persist for 1-2 hours depending on the dose and late phase effects, which include 
depression, agitation, normal heart rate, normal pupils, following binge use may last 
several days." Id. The study warns that "[t]he presence of cocaine at a given blood 
concentration cannot usually be associated with a degree of impairment or a specific 
effect for a given individual without additional information. This is due to many factors, 
including individual levels of tolerance to the drug and antifactual changes in cocaine 
concentrations on storage." Id 
The NHTSA study on Morphine also states that "[pjositive morphine urine results 
generally indicate use within the last two to three days, or longer after prolonged use." 
Dr. Fiona Couper, Ph.D, ET AL, U.S. Dep't of Transportation: Nat'l Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets - Morphine (and 
Heroin) (visited August 17, 2005) <http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/ 
jobl85drugs/morphine.htm>. See Addendum F. Yet, "the overall effects [of morphine] 
wear off in 3-5 hours, depending on dose." Id Again, the study warns that "[tjolerance 
makes interpretation of blood or plasma morphine concentrations extremely difficult." Id. 
The NHTSA study on Methamphetamine states "[pjositive urine results generally 
indicate use within 1-4 days but could be up to a week following heavy chronic use." 
Dr. Fiona Couper, Ph.D, ET AL, U.S. Dep't of Transportation: Nat'l Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration, Drugs and Human Performance Fact Sheets - Methamphetamine 
(and Amphetamine) (visited August 17, 2005) 
<http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/people/injury/research/jobl85drugs/methamphetamine.htm>. 
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See Addendum G. In fact, the "[r]ate of excretion into the urine is heavily influenced by 
urinary pH." Id Yet, again, the "[o]verall effects [of methamphetamine] typically last 4-
8 hours." Id 
The study's findings support the court of appeals concern that the state's definition 
of "consumption" could subject individuals to prosecution "whether or not [they had] 
ever used or possessed any narcotics within the State." Ireland, 2005 UT App 22 at % 20 
(quoting Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666). As in Robinson, the state's broad power "to 
regulate the narcotic drugs traffic within its borders is not" at issue. Robinson, 370 U.S. 
at 664. However, like the status offense created as a result of California's interpretation 
of its statute in Robinson, the state in this case seeks to subject individuals who have a 
detectable substance in their body to criminal prosecution even if they are not suffering 
from its effects and "whether or not [they have] ever used or possessed any narcotics 




For the reasons outlined above, Mr. Ireland respectfully asks this Court to affirm 
the court of appeals' decision. 
SUBMITTED this W* day of August, 2005. 
DEBRA M. NELSON 
LISA J. REMAL 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
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GREENWOOD, Judge: 
51 Defendant Jeffrey Don Ireland appeals his conviction of 
unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, a third degree 
felony. See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (2002). ;i; Defendant 
alleges that the trial court misinterpreted the meaning of 
"consumption" under Utah Code section 58-37-2(1)(dd). Utah Code Ann. 
§ 58-37-2 (1) (dd) (2002). We reverse. 
BACKGROUND 
12 On November 3, 2001, while driving a car in Salt Lake County, 
Defendant hit another vehicle, resulting in the death of its driver. 
While at a hospital following the accident, West Valley Police 
Officer Buchanan observed Defendant exhibiting what he regarded as 
symptoms of a person under the influence of a narcotic: constricted 
pupils, dry mouth, muscle tremors, deliberate, short sentences, and 
an unsteady gait. On this basis, Officer Buchanan obtained a search 
warrant to test Defendant's blood and urine for controlled 
substances. Notwithstanding the absence of any narcotic in 
Defendant's urine samples, Defendant's blood tested positive for 
marijuana and 0.1 mcg/ml of methamphetamine. 
53 While the presence of controlled substances was detected in 
Defendant's blood, he did not have any paraphernalia or drugs 
packaged for use with him. Despite this, the State charged Defendant 
with unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance for the 
methamphetamine, a third degree felony, and driving with a measurable 
controlled substance in the body for the marijuana, a class B 
misdemeanor. 
14 In a pretrial ruling, the court determined that it had 
jurisdiction over the possession or use of a controlled substance 
charge. The trial court concluded that "'consumption' continued so 
long as the methamphetamine was being metabolized in [D]efendant's 
body." Furthermore, the trial court reasoned that, because Defendant 
was metabolizing the methamphetamine before, during, and after the 
accident, his unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance 
was committed at least partly within this state, and thus established 
jurisdiction. Defendant then pleaded guilty to both charges, but 
reserved the right to appeal the trial court's jurisdiction regarding 
the felony charge. 
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ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
55 Defendant presents two arguments in support of his contention 
that the trial court misinterpreted the possession or use statute. 
First, he asserts that the plain meaning of "consumption," as used in 
section 58-37-2(1)(dd) does not include a substance being metabolized 
in the body. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1) (dd) . Second, he argues that 
the trial court violated his right to due process by improperly 
shifting the burden to him to show that the substance found in his 
blood was not consumed in Utah. 
56 Both of Defendant's arguments hinge on his assertion that the 
trial court misinterpreted the statutory meaning of "consumption." As 
such, "[t]he proper interpretation of a statute is a question of law 
which we review for correctness, according no deference to the 
[judge's] legal conclusion." State v. Redd, 1999 UT 108,510, 992 P.2d 
986. 
ANALYSIS 
I. Plain Meaning of "Consumption" Under Section 58-37-2(1)(dd) 
57 Defendant contends that the trial court erred in ruling that it 
had jurisdiction over the felony charge, determining that 
"consumption," as included in the definition of possession or use of 
a controlled substance under section 58-37-2(1)(dd), is an ongoing 
process in which the body physiologically metabolizes the substance. 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(1)(dd). This issue presents a question of 
first impression in Utah. 
58 "When interpreting a statute, this court looks first to the 
statute's plain language to determine the Legislature's intent and 
purpose. We read the plain language of the statute as a whole, and 
interpret its provisions in harmony with other statutes in the same 
chapter and related chapters." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12,517, 66 
P.3d 592. When interpreting a statute, this court seeks to "avoid 
interpretations that will render portions of a statute superfluous or 
inoperative." State v. Maestas, 2002 UT 123,552, 63 P.3d 621 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
59 Utah Code section 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) makes it unlawful "for any 
person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled 
substance." Utah Code Ann. § 57-37-8 (2) (a) (i) . The relevant part of 
section 58-37-2 (1) (dd) defines "possession or use" under chapter 37 
as "the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or 
consumption . . . of controlled substances." Id. § 58-37-2(1)(dd) 
(emphasis added). 
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110 We first look to the ordinary meaning of "consumption." 
Black's Law Dictionary defines "consumption" as "[t]he act of 
destroying a thing by using it; the use of a thing in a way that 
thereby exhausts it." Blackfs Law Dictionary 312 (7th ed. 1999). 
Webster1s defines "consumption" as "the act or process of consuming 
[.]" Webster!s Ninth New College Dictionary 282 (1986). Further, 
Websterfs defines "consume" as "to do away with completely[,] . . . 
to spend wastefully[,] . . . to eat or drink esp. in great quantity 
[,] . . .to waste or burn away[.]" Id. 
111 Defendant argues for a narrow interpretation of "consumption." 
He suggests that, when looking at the surrounding nouns of the 
statute, "consumption" is a present tense nominal describing the 
introduction of a substance into the body, and not an ongoing 
metabolic process. We agree. 
512 Had the Utah Legislature wanted to make the metabolization of 
controlled substances a crime in section 58-37-2 (1) (dd), it could 
have done so by explicitly including it as it has done in other 
statutes related to controlled substances. Indeed, the Utah Code 
currently contains nine sections that use the term "metabolite" in 
connection with controlled substances. ' See Utah Code Ann. §§ 41-6-
44.10(1) (a), -44.12 (2) (c), -44.6(2) (Supp. 2004) (dealing with motor 
vehicles); see also id. §§ 53-3-220 (1) (a) (xiii), -223(1) (a) (2002) 
(concerning public safety); icL_ §§ 34-41-101(2), -102(2), 34A-2-302 
(4) (a) (i) (2001) (relating to labor). 
513 Statutes from other states support a narrow definition of the 
term "consumption." Michigan's impaired driving statute defines 
"consumed" as "to have eaten, drunk, ingested, inhaled, injected, or 
topically applied, or to have performed any combination of those 
actions, or otherwise introduced into the body." Mich. Comp. Laws. § 
768.37(3) (b) (2004). Oregon defines "ingest" as "to consume or 
otherwise deliver a controlled substance into the body of a person." 
Or. Rev. Stat. § 475.984 (3) (c) (2003). And Texas defines "human 
consumption" as "the injection, inhalation, ingestion, or application 
of a substance to or into the body." Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. 
§ 481.002(21) (2004). The State, on the other hand, cites no statutes 
in support of their position that "consumption" is defined as 
including metabolization. Thus, we are unpersuaded that our 
legislature intended "consumption" under section 58-37-2 (1) (dd) to 
include metabolization of controlled substances. 
514 In addition, caselaw from this state and others supports this 
interpretation. In State v. Sorenson, a minor was arrested for 
unlawfully possessing alcohol when an officer smelled the substance 
on his breath during a traffic stop. See 758 P.2d 466, 467 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1988) . Notwithstanding the absence of alcohol on his person or a 
failed sobriety test, Sorenson was convicted of illegally possessing 
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alcohol. See id. This court agreed with the trial court's finding 
"that the mere presence of alcohol on the breath or in the 
bloodstream does not constitute possession under the statute." Id. at 
468. Further, this court remarked in a footnote that such a "position 
is consistent with well-reasoned decisions from other jurisdictions 
which have addressed the issue." Id. at 468 n.2 (citing State v. 
Lewis, 394 N.W.2d 212, 217 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Hornaday, 
713 P.2d 71, 76 (Wash. 1986), superseded by statute on other 
grounds). 
lib Other state appellate courts have addressed this issue as 
well. In State v. Flinchpauqh, the defendant was involved in a car 
accident that resulted in the death of the other car's driver. See 
659 P.2d 208, 209-10 (Kan. 1983). A blood test revealed the presence 
of controlled substances. See id. at 210. Without presenting evidence 
as to how the substances were "introduced into the defendant's 
system," the State charged Flinchpaugh with possession of a 
controlled substance. Id. Affirming the lower court's dismissal of 
the charge, the Kansas Supreme Court concluded that "[o]nce a 
controlled substance is within a person's system, the power of the 
person to control, possess, use, dispose of, or cause harm is at an 
end. The drug is assimilated by the body. The ability to control the 
drug is beyond human capabilities." Id. at 211. 
1116 The Washington Supreme Court reached a similar conclusion in 
State v. Hornaday, 713 P.2d 71 (Wash. 1986). In Hornaday, a minor was 
charged with illegal consumption or possession of alcohol. See id. at 
73. The court analogized the alcohol in that case with narcotics, 
noting that "[o]nce a narcotic is injected into the vein, or 
swallowed orally, it is no longer in the individual's control for the 
purposes of possession." Id. at 75. Furthermore, the court concluded 
that "the terms 'consume' and 'possession' . . . do not include the 
stage at which the liquor has already been swallowed but is still 
being assimilated by the body." Id. at 76; see also State v. Abu-
Shanab, 448 N.W.2d 557, 559 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) (concluding that to 
"'consume,' in the context of alcoholic beverages, means to drink, 
and that once drunk, alcohol is no longer being consumed."). 
Ill Hornaday has been cited as a case that exposes the "absurdity 
of defining the word 'consume' so as to encompass the metabolization 
of alcohol in the body." State v. Preston, 832 P.2d 513, 516 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1992). In justifying the result, the Hornaday court examined 
the impact of a contrary ruling. The court suggested that the broader 
interpretation of "consume" or "possess" would subject minors to 
prosecution if they ventured across state lines to drink legally in a 
neighboring state if, upon their return, there was any trace of 
alcohol still in their system. See Hornaday, 713 P.2d at 77. 
SI18 While the State -did not counter with cases supporting its 
broad conception of "consumption," it attempted to distinguish this 
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line of cases, suggesting that they apply to consumption of alcohol 
and not drugs. Thus, the State advocated two definitions of 
"consumption": one for alcohol and one for drugs. We, however, do not 
think that the legislature intended two different meanings of 
"consumption" in the Utah Code. Furthermore, multiple definitions 
would be potentially confusing to the public's perception of what 
behavior is prohibited. 
519 The State next argues that the narrow definition of 
"consumption" renders the other listed nouns--"application, 
inhalation, swallowing, injection"--superfluous. Utah Code Ann. § 58-
37-2(1)(dd). However, it is more likely that "consumption" was 
included in section 58-37-2(1)(dd) as a catchall term to encompass 
novel methods of introducing a substance into the body. Indeed, drug 
users have proven most creative in discovering new ways to administer 
substances. Accordingly, we hold that "consumption" under section 58-
37-2(1)(dd) is a method of introducing a substance into the body. 
SI20 Furthermore, a contrary holding would subject "status 
criminals," such as drug addicts, to continuous guilt for possession 
or use of a controlled substance, "whether or not [they had] ever 
used or possessed any narcotics within the State." Robinson v. 
California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962) (holding that imprisonment of 
drug addict in a state where he never used any narcotic drugs would 
be cruel and unusual punishment in violation of Fourteenth 
Amendment). Additionally, with improved drug testing, such as hair 
follicle analysis, the State's broad definition of "consumption" 
could subject individuals to prosecution who used drugs months or 
even years prior because of the substance's continued presence in 
their bodies. See Major Samuel J. Rob, Drug Detection by Hair 
Analysis, 1991 Army Law. 10, 10-14 (describing the process of drug 
testing via hair follicle analysis). Hence, the trial court erred by 
adopting a broad definition of "consumption" to include 
metabolization. 
II. Due Process 
121 Finally, Defendant argues that the trial court violated the 
due process clause of Article I, Section 7 of the Utah State 
Constitution, as well as the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the 
United States Constitution, by improperly shifting to him the burden 
to show that the court lacked jurisdiction to hear the possession or 
use charge. Defendant asserts that the trial court erred by finding 
that !f[i]n order to establish jurisdiction, the State need not prove 
where the defendant ingested the methamphetamine." 
1122 To prosecute a person in Utah, the State must establish 
jurisdiction by showing that the offense was "committed either wholly 
or partly within the state," Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-201(1) (a) (2003), 
by a preponderance of the evidence. See id. § 76-1-501(3) (2003). At 
trial, the court relied on the broad definition of "consumption" that 
allowed the mere metabolization of a controlled substance while in 
the state to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements. We have 
rejected that view. Because the trial court used the broad 
definition, it improperly asserted jurisdiction over the possession 
or use of a controlled substance charge. As a result, we need not 
determine if the trial court erred by requiring Defendant to refute 
the State's assertion of jurisdiction. 
CONCLUSION 
523 Consistent with statutes and cases from this and other 
jurisdictions, "consumption" under section 58-37-2(1)(dd) is a method 
of introducing a substance into the body. Id. § 58-37-2(1) (dd) . The 
trial court erred in concluding that metabolization of a controlled 
substance earlier introduced constituted "consumption." Furthermore, 
because the State offered no evidence of where Defendant consumed the 
drugs, the trial court lacked evidence to establish that the crime of 
possession or use of a controlled substance took place in whole or in 
part in Utah. Therefore, the trial court erred in asserting 
jurisdiction. 
524 Accordingly, we reverse Defendant's conviction on the felony 
unlawful possession charge. 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
525 I CONCUR: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
THORNE, judge (concurring): 
526 I wholeheartedly agree with the majority opinion, and write 
only to highlight my principal difficulty with the State's position. 
Under the State's view, the penalties associated with the dangers 
posed by drug use are stood on their head. A pedestrian arrested with 
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a controlled substance in their blood—regardless of their activities 
at the time of the arrest--would be subject to a greater penalty than 
someone arrested for driving with a measurable amount of a controlled 
substance in their blood. See Utah Code Ann. §§ 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) 
(2003); 41-6-44(2)(a)(ii) (1998). The State argues that the 
legislature intended this result and that the legislature has the 
right and the authority to make this distinction. I agree that the 
legislature has both the right and the authority. But, in the absence 
of an express legislative statement supporting the State's position, 
we should avoid drawing problematic conclusions. See Rowley v. Public 
Serv. Comm'n, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, 519 (1947) (stating "fa 
purpose to disregard sound public policy must not be attributed to 
the lawmaking power, except upon the most cogent evidence, and it is 
the duty of the courts to render such an interpretation of the laws 
as will best promote the protection of the public1" (citation 
omitted)); Department of Human Servs. v. B.R., 2002 UT App 25,19, 
42 P.3d 390 (accepting parenthetically that "following the literal 
statutory wording is not required when to do so would defeat 
legislative intent and make the statute absurd" (quotations and 
citation omitted)). 
f27 Here, adopting the State's position would lead to the absurd 
result that the unlawful possession or use of a controlled substance, 
a felony, would become a lesser-included offense of driving with any 
measurable amount of a controlled substance in the blood, a 
misdemeanor. Moreover, in those cases not involving a vehicle, the 
State's position amounts to imposing a greater penalty upon a 
sleeping, standing, or walking defendant who is in possession through 
presence in the blood, than upon a driver who is actively endangering 
others by operating a potentially deadly vehicle with a measurable 
amount of a controlled substance in the blood. Driving under the 
influence of alcohol or drugs creates a grave public safety concern, 
and the mayhem that results from it is one that the legislature 
clearly intends to punish harshly. It makes little sense to treat an 
offender who has prohibited drugs in his bloodstream less seriously 
if he moves behind the wheel of a vehicle, than if he merely chooses 
to walk to his destination. Adopting the State's position would 
create just such a result. 
S128 Accordingly, I concur. 
William A. Thorne Jr., Judge 
1. Although the legislature has amended this statute since Defendant 
was charged, the amendments do not affect the outcome of this case. 
See Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (2002). Therefore, for ease of 
reference, we cite to the most recent version of this statute. 
2. A "metabolite" is "a product of metabolism[.]" Webster's Ninth New 
College Dictionary 745 (1986). 
1. In further support of this principle, the Rowley court also 
stated: 
We have not overlooked the legal principle that if the intent 
of the legislature is by the statute made clear and certain, 
even though we may believe the legislation absurd and 
undesirable, we cannot substitute the judgment of the court 
for the judgment of the legislature. On the other hand, when 
the legislative intent is not clear and certain, and a 
literal interpretation of the language of the statute gives 
an absurd result, then the court is justified in searching 
the enactment for further indications of legislative intent. 
Rowley v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 112 Utah 116, 185 P.2d 514, 519-20 
(1947). Here, the majority has ably divined the legislative intent 




(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties: 
(a) It is unlawful: 
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a 
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescrip-
tion or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of 
his professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter; 
58-37-2 
(dd) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, 
control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the 
application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distin-
guished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes individ-
ual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person 
to be a possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that 
he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the 
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly 
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of 
any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the 
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating 
that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and 
control over it. 
76-1-201. Jurisdiction of offenses. 
(1) A person is subject to prosecution in this state for an offense which he 
commits, while either within or outside the state, by his own conduct or that of 
another for which he is legally accountable, if: 
(a) the offense is committed either wholly or partly within the state; 
(b) the conduct outside the state constitutes an attempt to commit an 
offense within the state; 
(c) the conduct outside the state constitutes a conspiracy to commit an 
offense within the state and an act in furtherance of the conspiracy occurs 
in the state; or 
(d) the conduct within the state constitutes an attempt, solicitation, or 
conspiracy to commit in another jurisdiction an offense under the laws of 
both this state and such other jurisdiction. 
(2) An offense is committed partly within this state if either the conduct 
which is any element of the offense, or the result which is such an element, 
occurs within this state. 
(3) In homicide offenses, the "result" is either the physical contact which 
causes death or the death itself. 
(a) If the body of a homicide victim is found within the state, the death 
shall be presumed to have occurred within the state. 
(b) If jurisdiction is based on such a presumption, this state shall retain 
jurisdiction unless the defendant proves by clear and convincing evidence 
that: 
(i) the result of the homicide did not occur in this state; and 
(ii) the defendant did not engage in any conduct in this state which 
is any element of the offense. 
(4) An offense which is based on an omission to perform a duty imposed by 
the law of this state is committed within the state regardless of the location of 
the offender at the time of the omission. 
(5) The judge shall determine jurisdiction. 
76-1-202. Venue of actions. 
(1) Criminal actions shall be tried in the county, district, or precinct where 
the offense is alleged to have been committed. In determining the proper place 
of trial, the following provisions shall apply: 
(a) If the commission of an offense commenced outside the state is 
consummated within this state, the offender shall be tried in the county 
where the offense is consummated. 
(b) When conduct constituting elements of an offense or results that 
constitute elements, whether the conduct or result constituting elements 
is in itself unlawful, shall occur in two or more counties, trial of the offense 
may be held in any of the counties concerned. 
(c) If a person committing an offense upon the person of another is 
located in one county and his victim is located in another county at the 
time of the commission of the offense, trial may be held in either county. 
(d) If a cause of death is inflicted in one county and death ensues in 
another county, the offender may be tried in either county. 
(e) A person who commits an inchoate offense may be tried in any 
county in which any act that is an element of the offense, including the 
agreement in conspiracy, is committed. 
(f) Where a person in one county solicits, aids, abets, agrees, or 
attempts to aid another in the planning or commission of an offense in 
another county, he may be tried for the offense in either county. 
(g) When an offense is committed within this state and it cannot be 
readily determined in which county or district the offense occurred, the 
following provisions shall be applicable: 
(i) When an offense is committed upon any railroad car, vehicle, 
watercraft, or aircraft passing within this state, the offender may be 
tried in any county through which such railroad car, vehicle, water-
craft, or aircraft has passed. 
(ii) When an offense is committed on any body of water bordering 
on or within this state, the offender may be tried in any county 
adjacent to such body of water. The words "body of water" shall 
include but not be limited to any stream, river, lake, or reservoir, 
whether natural or man-made. 
(iii) A person who commits theft may be tried in any county in 
which he exerts control over the property affected. 
(iv) If an offense is committed on or near the boundary of two or 
more counties, trial of the offense may be held in any of such counties. 
(v) For any other offense, trial may be held in the county in which 
the defendant resides, or, if he has no fixed residence, in the county in 
which he is apprehended or to which he is extradited. 
(2) All objections of improper place of trial are waived by a defendant unless 
made before trial. 
76-1-501. Presumption of innocence — "Element of the 
offense" defined. 
( D A defendant in a criminal proceeding is presumed to be innocent until 
each element of the offense charged against him is proved beyond a reasonable 
doubt. In absence of such proof, the defendant shall be acquitted. 
(2) As used in this part the words "element of the offense" mean: 
(a) The conduct, attendant circumstances, or results of conduct pro-
scribed, prohibited, or forbidden in the definition of the offense; 
(b) The culpable mental state required. 
(3) The existence of jurisdiction and venue are not elements of the offense 
but shall be established by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Addendum C 
February 6, 2002 Trwd jwdK** u« Jirict 
TO: Kent Morgan; District Attorney Administration ^U' 
SALT LAX6 COUNTY 
FROM: Kevin Murphy, Deputy District Attorney **- ooputyeE 
RE: Proposed Automobile Homicide Case State vs. Jeffrey Don Ireland 
SUMMARY/RECOMMENDATION: 
Per your instructions, DDA Bill Kendall and I have carefully reviewed this case. Besides 
reviewing reports submitted by Detective Mike Leary, we have spoken to other experts 
and have posed specific questions to Detective Leary. Some of what we relate factually is 
based on our conversations with Leary and others, and does not appear in the police 
reports. 
Based on our review, we recommend that Ireland be charged with DUI-measurable 
drug/metabolite, a class B misdemeanor, UCA 41-6-44.6. We may also consider charging 
him with F3 possession of methamphetamine and class B possession of marijuana, UCA 
58-37-8(2)(b)(ii), 58-37-8(2)(e). These latter two charges would be based upon his 
positive blood and urine tests; caselaw support for this charging theory is undeveloped. 
Because of problems proving impairment, negligent vehicle operation, or causation, we 
cannot recommend that he be charged either with felony 3 automobile homicide, UCA 
76-5-207, or with class A negligent homicide, 76-5-206, or with DUI-drug impairment, 
UCA41-6-44(2)(a)(ii). 
Alternatively, the case could be referred for further investigation, perhaps by this office. 
However, further investigation would not alleviate the eyewitness problem and 
impairment issues that underpin the current recommendation. 
FACTS/EVIDENCE: 
November 3, 2001 approximately 11 pm: Victim Angel Garcia, 19, stops northbound at a 
red light, on 1300 West at its intersection with 4000 South. There are two northbound 
lanes; Angel, in her just-purchased white 1991 Honda Accord, occupies the right lane; to 
her left, in another car, are eyewitnesses Amy (driver) and Cassius (passenger). 
Roads were dry. Except for normal darkness, no obstruction of vision noted. Intersection 
gets some additional illumination from a nearby apartment complex. Speed limit for 
eastbound traffic on 4000 South is 50 mph. According to Det. Leary's personal 
observation, the traffic light has a three-second "all red1' delay, so that when the light goes 
* 
red for one street, the light for the other street stays red an additional three seconds before 
turning green. (But Leary has recently spoken to a local street authority who says the 
light has a 4-5 second yellow, followed by one-second "all red.") 
After waiting at her red light, victim Angel proceeded northbound into the intersection, 
where a pickup truck driven by suspect Ireland, traveling eastbound at about 45 mph, hit 
the driver's side of Angel's Honda broadside, killing her instantly. Detective Leary, 
called out that night to investigate, observed no pre-impact skidmarks. 
Eyewitnesses Amy and Cassius have given conflicting statements about how the collision 
occurred. Amy originally stated that Ireland's truck entered the intersection while his 
light was yellow, and that victim Angel moved prematurely into the intersection ("she 
underestimated the light to change and went truck ran yellow light an hit the white car"). 
In a January 22 followup interview, she at first gave a consistent account about the travel 
of suspect's truck ("His light turned yellow, he thought he could make it"). But when 
asked for clarification, witness Amy became "adamant" that victim Angel did not move 
into the intersection until her light turned green. (As to why witness Amy did not also 
enter the intersection on this "green" light, she said "something told me not to go.") 
Eyewitness Cassius had been smoking marijuana just before the accident. His original 
statement omitted any mention of the traffic signal ("the lady was turning going east & 
the truck was turning at the same time & there it was"). In his January 22 followup 
interview, Cassius contradicted himself about the signal, stating variously that Ireland's 
truck entered the intersection when his light was yellow, or red. He also opined that 
victim Angel entered the intersection too soon ("the girl started moving into the 
intersection as her light was still red"). 
There are no other eyewitness statements about the crash. Det. Leary has been unable to 
locate any other eyewitnesses. 
Present information says nothing about suspect Ireland's behavior at the crash scene. He 
was evidently observed walking around & talking, but we have seen no reports about 
whether he appeared impaired. 
Ireland was taken by ambulance to Pioneer Valley Hospital. Ambulance attendant (name 
not provided) thought he smelled alcohol on Ireland. At hospital, Ireland was examined 
& released. We do not have ambulance crew's nor Pioneer Valley's treatment record for 
the suspect. According to Leary, the hospital did not draw any blood from Ireland. 
Deputy and DRE at hospital did not smell alcohol on suspect. 
Ireland refused to voluntarily give a blood sample. A DRE from West Valley Police tried 
to assess Ireland, who would not cooperate; indeed, he covered his eyes so the officer 
could not completely assess his pupils, which appeared constricted. The DRE, based on 
his limited observation opportunity, nevertheless opined that Ireland was under the 
influence of a narcotic analgesic. The deputy who transported Ireland from hospital to 
jail similarly observed Ireland's constricted pupils, deliberate, short sentences, and 
unsteady gait, and opined that he was impaired. A search warrant was obtained, blood 
and urine were taken from Ireland at about 4:30 am, 5 54 hours after the crash. 
The blood was positive for 0.1 mcg/ml methamphetamine. Blood and urine were positive 
for THC metabolite (inactive), which can remain in the system long after actual use of 
marijuana. Samples were negative for alcohol, negative for narcotic analgesics, negative 
for benzodiazepines (Valium-type medications). In short, the suspect's most possible 
source of chemical impairment, 5 XA hours post-crash, was methamphetamine. 
We independently asked Dr. Caravati of Poison Control and Terry Lamoreoux of State 
Tox. Lab about the meth level. Both experts state that there is no reliable way to "back-
extrapolate" the 0.1 meth level to the time of the crash: the metabolism rate is too 
variable. A "therapeutic" level for meth would be 0.02 to 0.09; however, the 0.1 level is 
not per se proof of impairment. Determination of impairment would depend upon the 
suspect's drug use pattern (chronic or acute), time of dose, drug tolerance, and 
driving/behavioral observations. 
Ireland refused to talk about the accident, so we do not know about his meth use pattern, 
time of ingestion, etc. (Reports do not say whether paraphernalia was found in his 
possession.) As to behavioral observations, Ireland appeared "on the nod," more 
consistent with painkillers/downers, than with meth use (for example, constricted pupils 
rather than dilated pupils). The observations are further complicated by two factors: one, 
he possibly got jolted in the accident itself, causing signs of impairment; two, reasonably 
reliable history, per Det. Leary via suspect's sister, that suspect has some chronic 
impairment due to a head injury suffered about 18 years ago (Leary observed the scar on 
suspect's head), which contributes to his unusual gait. The sister did, however, 
spontaneously ask Leary something to the effect of "what was [Ireland's] drug of choice 
this time?" 
The truck driven by Ireland was loaded with scrap metal and/or old automobile parts. 
However, consistent with post-crash photos, Det. Leary does not believe the load was 
overweight. It does not appear that the truck was inspected for mechanical problems, 
although Leary believes it is still sitting on an impound lot, and thus possibly available. 
Leary has not been able to contact the truck's registered owner, who reportedly has a 
criminal record (possible "Awesome Towing" history). 
ANALYSIS: 
The crucial elements for auto homicide and DUI-drug impaired, as applied to this case, 
are (1) drug-caused impairment; (2) negligent or criminally negligent operation of the 
vehicle; and (3) causation of death/serious injury. Negligent homicide omits the 
impairment element, but requires criminally negligent operation and causation. As 
follows, on the presently-known evidence, we are unlikely to prove any of these elements 
beyond reasonable doubt. 
(1) Drug-caused impairment. The 0.1 mcg/ml meth level, 5 lA hours post-accident, is 
inconclusive for impairment. The behavioral signs of impairment are incomplete 
due to suspect's noncompliance. The signs that were observed—sleepiness, 
droopy eyelids, constricted pupils, slow speech—are inconsistent with meth 
intoxication. Those signs can be attributed to the effects of the accident itself. 
Those signs also may be attributed to defendant's chronic effects from the old 
head injury. There is also a possibility that Ireland was in the physiological 
"slump" as the meth effects wore off, but this possibility also is speculative due to 
the incomplete and contradictory observations. There is no recognized, consistent 
standard for assessing impairment due to meth use. So, we see no compelling 
proof of impairment caused by suspect's drug use. 
(2) Negligent or criminally negligent driving. Currently-known witness observations 
are too contradictory to be helpful: there is no strong proof that Ireland ran a red 
light. If he entered the intersection while his light was yellow, as suggested by 
witness statements, he was doing nothing unusual or illegal. "Vehicular traffic 
facing a steady circular yellow . . . signal is warned that the allowable movement 
related to a green signal is being terminated." UCA 41-6-24(3)(a). And, 
according to Detective Leary, Ireland was driving within the posted speed limit. 
We have no information whether the truck driven by Ireland was in unsafe 
condition, nor whether Ireland, who did not own the truck, knew of any possible 
unsafe condition. Thus we see no compelling proof of negligent or criminally 
negligent driving by Ireland. 
(3) Causation. On the current evidence, it is possible that victim Angel made a tragic 
mistake that night, moving into the intersection before her light turned green. 
Evidence of this possibility could persuade a trial judge to give an instruction on 
superseding intervening cause. Cf. State v. Hamblin, 676 P.2d 376 (Utah 1983) 
(no superseding intervening cause instruction required where evidence 
compellingly demonstrated defendant's impairment and negligence). Obviously, 
this would hamper the prosecution. 
We do not know whether there are any other eyewitnesses to the accident. Perhaps it 
would be worthwhile to run some media advertisements, or place some flyers, asking 
possible eyewitnesses to come forward. If witnesses were found who could clearly 
confirm that victim Angel had the green light, it would be very helpful (Angel's light did 
not turn green until defendant's light had been red for three seconds—not to mention the 
warning time given by defendant's yellow light). But even so, such witnesses would have 
to overcome the ambiguity in the statements of Amy and Cassius, the only currently-
known eyewitnesses. (Confirmation that Ireland's light was red would be less helpful, 
because Angel's light would not turn green until Ireland's was red for three seconds.) 
CONCLUSION 
The most likely successful prosecution, at this point, would be class B DUI-measurable 
drugs/metabolite. 
It has been suggested that Ireland be charged with F3 possession of meth, based on the 
positive blood test (class B possession of marijuana might also be charged on the same 
evidence). Legal research supports using a positive blood/urine test as evidence of drug 
possession, in the context of probation violations, or termination of supervised release 
(some cases are attached). But our law clerks found no case where a criminal prosecution 
was founded on such evidence alone; thus we would be breaking new legal ground were 
we to proceed on this theory. 
I do not know how fertile that ground might be. On the positive side, the quantified meth 
result should strengthen our position to do this. In response to such prosecution, I would 
expect the defense to argue that the more specific statute—DUI measurable 
drugs/metabolite—should govern the case. Success on this "possession by consumption" 
theory looks like a tossup to me, probably dependent on appellate court review. 
Further investigation may be warranted, to try supporting an auto homicide or negligent 
homicide charge. Such investigation would need to focus on locating and interviewing 
other, heretofore unknown, eyewitnesses to the accident. 
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Marijuana is a green or gray mixture of dried shredded flowers and leaves of 
the hemp plant Cannabis sativa. Hashish consists of resinous secretions of 
the cannabis plant. Dronabinol (synthetic THC) is a light yellow resinous oil. 
Synonyms: Cannabis, marijuana, pot, reefer, buds, grass, weed, dope, 
ganja, herb, boom, gangster, Mary Jane, sinsemilla, shit, joint, hash, hash oil, 
blow, blunt, green, kilobricks, Thai sticks; Marinol® 
Source: Cannabis contains chemicals called cannabinoids, including 
cannabinol, cannabidiol, cannabinolidic acids, cannabigerol, 
cannabichromene, and several isomers of tetrahydrocannabinol (THC). One 
of these isomers, A " -THC, is believed to be responsible for most of the 
characteristic psychoactive effects of cannabis. Marijuana refers to the 
leaves and flowering tops of the cannabis plant; the buds are often preferred 
because of their higher THC content. Hashish consists of the THC-rich 
resinous secretions of the plant, which are collected, dried, compressed and 
smoked. Hashish oil is produced by extracting the cannabinoids from plant 
material with a solvent. In the U. S., marijuana, hashish and hashish oil are 
Schedule I controlled substances. Dronabinol (Marinol®) is a Schedule III 
controlled substance and is available in strengths of 2.5, 5 or 10 mg in round, 
soft gelatin capsules. 
Drug Class: Cannabis/Marijuana: spectrum of behavioral effects is unique, 
preventing classification of the drug as a stimulant, sedative, tranquilizer, or 
hallucinogen. Dronabinol: appetite stimulant, antiemetic. 
Medical and Recreational Uses: Medicinal: Indicated for the treatment of 
anorexia associated with weight loss in patients with AIDS, and to treat mild 
to moderate nausea and vomiting associated with cancer chemotherapy. 
Recreational: Marijuana is used for its mood altering effects, euphoria, and 
relaxation. Marijuana is the most commonly used illicit drug throughout the 
world. 
Potency, Purity and Dose: THC is the major psychoactive constituent of 
cannabis. Potency is dependent on THC concentration and is usually 
expressed as %THC per dry weight of material. Average THC concentration 
in marijuana is 1-5%, hashish 5-15%, and hashish oi l3 20%. The form of 
marijuana known as sinsemilla is derived from the unpollinated female 
cannabis plant and is preferred for its high THC content (up to 17% THC). 
Recreational doses are highly variable and users often titer their own dose. A 
single intake of smoke from a pipe or joint is called a hit (approximately 
1 /20th of a gram). The lower the potency or THC content the more hits are 
needed to achieve the desired effects; 1-3 hits of high potency sinsemilla is 
typically enough to produce the desired effects. In terms of its psychoactive 
effect, a drop or two of hash oil on a cigarette is equal to a single "joint" of 
marijuana. Medicinally, the initial starting dose of Marinol® is 2.5 mg, twice 
daily. 
Route of Administration: Marijuana is usually smoked as a cigarette ('joint') 
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or in a pipe or bong. Hollowed out cigars packed with marijuana are also 
common and are called \ Joints and blunts are often laced with adulterants 
including PCP or crack cocaine. Joints can also be dipped in liquid PCP or in 
codeine cough syrup. Marijuana is also orally ingested. 
Pharmacodynamics: THC binds to cannabinoid receptors and interferes 
with important endogenous cannabinoid neurotransmitter systems. Receptor 
distribution correlates with brain areas involved in physiological, psychomotor 
and cognitive effects. Correspondingly, THC produces alterations in motor 
behavior, perception, cognition, memory, learning, endocrine function, food 
intake, and regulation of body temperature. 
Pharmacokinetics: Absorption is slower following the oral route of 
administration with lower, more delayed peak THC levels. Bioavailability is 
reduced following oral ingestion due to extensive first pass metabolism. 
Smoking marijuana results in rapid absorption with peak THC plasma 
concentrations occurring prior to the end of smoking. Concentrations vary 
depending on the potency of marijuana and the manner in which the drug is 
smoked, however, peak plasma concentrations of 100-200 ng/mL are 
routinely encountered. Plasma THC concentrations generally fall below 5 
ng/mL less than 3 hours after smoking. THC is highly lipid soluble, and 
plasma and urinary elimination half-lives are best estimated at 3-4 days, 
where the rate-limiting step is the slow redistribution to plasma of THC 
sequestered in the tissues. Shorter half-lives are generally reported due to 
limited collection intervals and less sensitive analytical methods. Plasma 
THC concentrations in occasional users rapidly fall below limits of 
quantitation within 8 to 12 h. THC is rapidly and extensively metabolized with 
very little THC being excreted unchanged from the body. THC is primarily 
metabolized to 11-hydroxy-THC which has equipotent psychoactivity. The 
11-hydroxy-THC is then rapidly metabolized to the 11-nor-9-carboxy-THC 
(THC-COOH) which is not psychoactive. A majority of THC is excreted via 
the feces (-65%) with approximately 30% of the THC being eliminated in the 
urine as conjugated glucuronic acids and free THC hydroxylated metabolites. 
Molecuiar interactions I Receptor Chemistry: THC is metabolized via 
cytochrome P450 2C9, 2C11, and 3A isoenzymes. Potential inhibitors of 
these isoenzymes could decrease the rate of THC elimination if administered 
concurrently, while potential inducers could increase the rate of elimination. 
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio: 0.55 
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations: It is difficult to establish a 
relationship between a person's THC blood or plasma concentration and 
performance impairing effects. Concentrations of parent drug and metabolite 
are very dependent on pattern of use as well as dose. THC concentrations 
typically peak during the act of smoking, while peak 11-OH THC 
concentrations occur approximately 9-23 minutes after the start of smoking. 
Concentrations of both analytes decline rapidly and are often < 5 ng/mL at 3 
hours. Significant THC concentrations (7 to 18 ng/mL) are noted following 
even a single puff or hit of a marijuana cigarette. Peak plasma THC 
concentrations ranged from 46-188 ng/mL in 6 subjects after they smoked 
8.8 mg THC over 10 minutes. Chronic users can have mean plasma levels of 
THC-COOH of 45 ng/mL, 12 hours after use; corresponding THC levels are, 
however, less than 1 ng/mL. Following oral administration, THC 
concentrations peak at 1-3 hours and are lower than after smoking. 
Dronabinol and THC-COOH are present in equal concentrations in plasma 
and concentrations peak at approximately 2-4 hours after dosing. 
It is inadvisable to try and predict effects based on blood THC concentrations 
alone, and currently impossible to predict specific effects based on THC-
COOH concentrations. It is possible for a person to be affected by marijuana 
use with concentrations of THC in their blood below the limit of detection of 
the method. Mathematical models have been developed to estimate the time 
of marijuana exposure within a 95% confidence interval. Knowing the 
elapsed time from marijuana exposure can then be used to predict 
impairment in concurrent cognitive and psychomotor effects based on data in 
the published literature. 
Interpretation of Urine Test Results: Detection of total THC metabolites in 
urine, primarily THC-COOH-glucuronide, only indicates prior THC exposure. 
Detection time is well past the window of intoxication and impairment. 
Published excretion data from controlled clinical studies may provide a 
reference for evaluating urine cannabinoid concentrations; however, these 
data are generally reflective of occasional marijuana use rather than heavy, 
chronic marijuana exposure. It can take as long as 4 hours for THC-COOH to 
appear in the urine at concentrations sufficient to trigger an immunoassay (at 
50ng/mL) following smoking. Positive test results generally indicate use 
within 1-3 days; however, the detection window could be significantly longer 
following heavy, chronic, use. Following single doses of Marinol®, low levels 
of dronabinol metabolites have been detected for more than 5 weeks in urine. 
Low concentrations of THC have also been measured in over-the-counter 
hemp oil products - consumption of these products may produce positive 
urine cannabinoid test results. 
Effects: Pharmacological effects of marijuana vary with dose, route of 
administration, experience of user, vulnerability to psychoactive effects, and 
setting of use. 
Psychological: At recreational doses, effects include relaxation, euphoria, 
relaxed inhibitions, sense of well-being, disorientation, altered time and 
space perception, lack of concentration, impaired learning and memory, 
alterations in thought formation and expression, drowsiness, sedation, mood 
changes such as panic reactions and paranoia, and a more vivid sense of 
taste, sight, smell, and hearing. Stronger doses intensify reactions and may 
cause fluctuating emotions, flights of fragmentary thoughts with disturbed 
associations, a dulling of attention despite an illusion of heightened insight, 
image distortion, and psychosis. 
Physiological: The most frequent effects include increased heart rate, 
reddening of the eyes, dry mouth and throat, increased appetite, and 
vasodilatation. 
Side Effect Profile: Fatigue, paranoia, possible psychosis, memory 
problems, depersonalization, mood alterations, urinary retention, 
constipation, decreased motor coordination, lethargy, slurred speech, and 
dizziness. Impaired health including lung damage, behavioral changes, and 
reproductive, cardiovascular and immunological effects have been 
associated with regular marijuana use. Regular and chronic marijuana 
smokers may have many of the same respiratory problems that tobacco 
smokers have (daily cough and phlegm, symptoms of chronic bronchitis), as 
the amount of tar inhaled and the level of carbon monoxide absorbed by 
marijuana smokers is 3 to 5 times greater than among tobacco smokers. 
Smoking marijuana while shooting up cocaine has the potential to cause 
severe increases in heart rate and blood pressure. 
Duration of Effects: Effects from smoking cannabis products are felt within 
minutes and reach their peak in 10-30 minutes. Typical marijuana smokers 
experience a high that lasts approximately 2 hours. Most behavioral and 
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physiological effects return to baseline levels within 3-5 hours after drug use, 
although some investigators have demonstrated residual effects in specific 
behaviors up to 24 hours, such as complex divided attention tasks. 
Psychomotor impairment can persist after the perceived high has dissipated. 
In long term users, even after periods of abstinence, selective attention 
(ability to filter out irrelevant information) has been shown to be adversely 
affected with increasing duration of use, and speed of information processing 
has been shown to be impaired with increasing frequency of use. Dronabinol 
has an onset of 30-60 minutes, peak effects occur at 2-4 hours, and it can 
stimulate the appetite for up to 24 hours. 
Tolerance, Dependence and Withdrawal Effect: Tolerance may develop to 
some pharmacological effects of dronabinol. Tolerance to many of the effects 
of marijuana may develop rapidly after only a few doses, but also disappears 
rapidly. Marijuana is addicting as it causes compulsive drug craving, seeking, 
and use, even in the face of negative health and social consequences. 
Additionally, animal studies suggests marijuana causes physical 
dependence. A withdrawal syndrome is commonly seen in chronic marijuana 
users following abrupt discontinuation. Symptoms include restlessness, 
irritability, mild agitation, hyperactivity, insomnia, nausea, cramping, 
decreased appetite, sweating, and increased dreaming. 
Drug Interactions: Cocaine and amphetamines may lead to increased 
hypertension, tachycardia and possible cardiotoxicity. Benzodiazepines, 
barbiturates, ethanol, opioids, antihistamines, muscle relaxants and other 
CNS depressants increase drowsiness and CNS depression. When taken 
concurrently with alcohol, marijuana is more likely to be a traffic safety risk 
factor than when consumed alone. 
Performance Effects: The short term effects of marijuana use include 
problems with memory and learning, distorted perception, difficultly in 
thinking and problem-solving, and loss of coordination. Heavy users may 
have increased difficulty sustaining attention, shifting attention to meet the 
demands of changes in the environment, and in registering, processing and 
using information. In general, laboratory performance studies indicate that 
sensory functions are not highly impaired, but perceptual functions are 
significantly affected. The ability to concentrate and maintain attention are 
decreased during marijuana use, and impairment of hand-eye coordination is 
dose-related over a wide range of dosages.Impairment in retention time and 
tracking, subjective sleepiness, distortion of time and distance, vigilance, and 
loss of coordination in divided attention tasks have been reported. Note 
however, that subjects can often "pull themselves together" to concentrate on 
simple tasks for brief periods of time. Significant performance impairments 
are usually observed for at least 1-2 hours following marijuana use, and 
residual effects have been reported up to 24 hours. 
Effects on Driving: The drug manufacturer suggests that patients receiving 
treatment with Marinol® should be specifically warned not to drive until it is 
established that they are able to tolerate the drug and perform such tasks 
safely. Epidemiology data from road traffic arrests and fatalities indicate that 
after alcohol, marijuana is the most frequently detected psychoactive 
substance among driving populations. Marijuana has been shown to impair 
performance on driving simulator tasks and on open and closed driving 
courses for up to approximately 3 hours. Decreased car handling 
performance, increased reaction times, impaired time and distance 
estimation, inability to maintain headway, lateral travel, subjective sleepiness, 
motor incoordination, and impaired sustained vigilance have all been 
reported. Some drivers may actually be able to improve performance for brief 
periods by overcompensating for self-perceived impairment. The greater the 
demands placed on the driver, however, the more critical the likely 
h t t T ) 7 / W W W n V l t O Q r\^+ r r / ^ r 
impairment. Marijuana may particularly impair monotonous and prolonged 
driving. Decision times to evaluate situations and determine appropriate 
responses increase. Mixing alcohol and marijuana may dramatically produce 
effects greater than either drug on its own. 
DEC Category: Cannabis 
DEC Profile: Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze 
nystagmus not present; lack of convergence present; pupil size normal to 
dilated; reaction to light normal to slow; pulse rate elevated; blood pressure 
elevated; body temperature normal to elevated. Other characteristic 
indicators may include odor of marijuana in car or on subject's breath, 
marijuana debris in mouth, green coating of tongue, bloodshot eyes, body 
and eyelid tremors, relaxed inhibitions, incomplete thought process, and poor 
performance on field sobriety tests. 
Panel's Assessment of Driving Risks: Low doses of THC moderately 
impair cognitive and psychomotor tasks associated with driving, while severe 
driving impairment is observed with high doses, chronic use and in 
combination with low doses of alcohol The more difficult and unpredictable 
the task, the more likely marijuana will impair performance. 
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Cocaine hydrochloride is a white to light brown crystalline powder, shiny 
rather than dull in appearance. Cocaine base is white to beige in color; 
waxy/soapy to flaky solid chunks. 
Synonyms: Methylbenzoylecgonine. Cocaine hydrochloride: coke, snow, 
flake, blow, cane, dust, shake, toot, nose candy, white lady. Cocaine base: 
crack, rock, free-base. 
Source: Naturally derived CNS stimulant extracted and refined from the 
leaves of the coca plant (Erythroxylon coca), grown primarily in the Andean 
region of South America and to a lesser extent in India, Africa and Indonesia. 
The picked coca leaves are dried in the open air and then "stomped" as part 
of the process to extract the alkaloid, resulting in coca paste and eventually 
cocaine hydrochloride. It is illegal to possess and sell cocaine in the U.S. and 
cocaine is a Schedule II controlled substance. "Crack" is the street name 
given to cocaine that has been processed from cocaine hydrochloride. It is 
prepared by adding baking soda to aqueous cocaine hydrochloride and 
heating it until the free-base cocaine precipitates into small pellets. The 
mixture is cooled and filtered, and then the "rocks" are smoked in a crack 
pipe. 
Drug Class: CNS stimulant, local anesthetic. 
Medical and Recreational Uses: Minor use as a topical local anesthetic for 
ear, nose and throat surgery. Traditionally, the coca leaves are chewed or 
brewed into a tea for refreshment and to relieve fatigue. Recreationally, 
cocaine is u sed to increase alertness, relieve fatigue, feel stronger and more 
decisive, and is abused for its intense euphoric effects. 
Potency, Purity and Dose: In ear, nose and throat surgery cocaine is 
commercially supplied as the hydrochloride salt in a 40 or 100 mg/mL 
solution. Depending on the demographic region, street purity of cocaine 
hydrochloride can range from 20-95%, while that of crack cocaine is 20-80%. 
The hydrochloride powder is often diluted with a variety of substances such 
as sugars for bulk (lactose, sucrose, inositol, mannitol), other CNS stimulants 
(caffeine, ephedrine, phenylpropanolamine), or other local anesthetics 
(lidocaine, procaine, benzocaine). Commonly abused doses are 10-120 mg. 
Repeated doses are frequently taken to avoid the dysphoric crash that often 
follows the initial intense euphoric effects. Cocaine is frequently used in 
combination with other drugs; injected with heroin ("speedball") or taken with 
alcohol to reduce irritability; smoked with phencyclidine ("tick"); and smoked 
in marijuana blunts ("turbo"). 
Route of Administration: Topically applied for use as a local anesthetic. 
Recreationally, coca leaves can be chewed, however, cocaine abusers 
typically smoke "crack" in a glass pipe or inject the hydrochloride salt 
intravenously. Cocaine hydrochloride can be smoked to some effect but this 
is very inefficient as the powder tends to burn rather than vaporize. Snorting 
(insufflation/intranasal) is also popular. Subcutaneous injection (skin-
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popping) is rarely used. 
Pharmacodynamics: Cocaine is a strong CNS stimulant that interferes with 
the reabsorption process of catecholamines, particularly dopamine, a 
chemical messenger associated with pleasure and movement. Cocaine 
prevents the reuptake of dopamine by blocking the dopamine transporter 
which leads to increased extracellular dopamine, resulting in chronic 
stimulation of postsynaptic dopamine receptors. This results in the euphoric 
'rush'. When dopamine levels subsequently fall, users experience a 
dysphoric 'crash'. Similarly, cocaine interferes with the uplake of 
norepinephrine and serotonin (5-HT), leading to accumulation of these 
neurotransmitters at postsynaptic receptors. As a local anesthetic, cocaine 
reversibly blocks the initiation and conduction of the nerve impulse. Cocaine 
additionally produces vasoconstriction and dilated pupils. 
Pharmacokinetics: Cocaine is rapidly absorbed following smoking, snorting 
and intravenous administration. Bioavailability is 57% following snorting and 
-70% following smoking. Cocaine is 91% bound in plasma. Cocaine is 
extensively metabolized to a variety of compounds: benzoylecgonine, 
ecgonine, and ecgonine methyl ester are the major metabolites and are 
centrally inactive. Benzoylecgonine is produced upon loss of the methyl 
group and is the major urinary metabolite. Norcocaine is a very minor 
metabolite, but is active and neurotoxic. Cocaethylene, formed following 
concurrent ingestion of cocaine and alcohol, is also active and is equipotent 
to cocaine in blocking dopamine reuptake. The apparent half-life for cocaine 
is short, approximately 0.8 ± 0.2 hours, while the half-life of benzoylecgonine 
is 6 hours. 
Molecular Interactions I Receptor Chemistry: The cytochrome P450 3A4 
isoenzyme is responsible for the N-demethylation of cocaine to norcocaine. 
Potential inhibitors of the 3A4 isoenzyme could decrease the rate of drug 
elimination if administered concurrently, while potential inducers could 
increase the rate of drug elimination. Cocaine itself is an inhibitor of the 
CYP2D6 isoform. 
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio: averages ~ 1.0 
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations: The presence of cocaine at a 
given blood concentration cannot usually be associated with a degree of 
impairment or a specific effect for a given individual without additional 
information. This is due to many factors, including individual levels of 
tolerance to the drug and artifactual changes in cocaine concentrations on 
storage. There is a large overlap between therapeutic, toxic and lethal 
cocaine concentrations and adverse reactions have been reported after 
prolonged use even with no measurable parent drug in the blood. Typical 
concentrations in abuse range from 0-1mg/L, however, concentrations up to 
5mg/L and higher are survivable in tolerant individuals. After single doses of 
cocaine, plasma concentration typically average 0.2-0.4 mg/L Repeated 
doses of cocaine may result in concentrations greater than 0 75 mg/L. 
Following intranasal administration of 106 mg, peak plasma concentrations of 
cocaine averaged 0.22 mg/L at 30 minutes, while benzoylecgonine 
concentrations averaged 0.61 mg/L at 3 hours. Oral administration of 140 
mg/70 kg cocaine resulted in peak plasma concentrations averaging 0.21 
mg/L of cocaine at 1 hour. Single 32 mg intravenous doses of cocaine 
produced an average peak plasma concentration of 0.31 mg/L of cocaine 
within 5 minutes. Smoking 50 mg of cocaine base resulted in peak plasma 
cocaine concentrations averaging 0.23 mg/L at - 45 minutes and 0.15 mg/L 
of benzoylecgonine at 1.5 hours. 
Interpretation of Urine Test Results: Urinary excretion is less than 2% for 
unchanged cocaine, 26-39% for benzoylecgonine, and 18-22% for ecgonine 
methyl ester. 64-69% of the initial dose is recovered after 3 days. Very low 
concentrations of cocaine may be detected in urine during the initial few 
hours, however, benzoylecgonine persists in urine at detectable 
concentrations from 2-4 days. Chronic, heavy use of cocaine can result in 
detectable amounts of benzoylecgonine in urine for up to 10 days following a 
binge. 
Effects: 
Early phase - Psychological: Euphoria, excitation, feelings of well-being, 
general arousal, increased sexual excitement, dizziness, self-absorbed, 
increased focus and alertness, mental clarity, increased talkativeness, motor 
restlessness, offsets fatigue, improved performance in some simple tasks, 
and loss of appetite. Higher doses may exhibit a pattern of psychosis with 
confused and disoriented behavior, delusions, hallucinations, irritability, fear, 
paranoia, antisocial behavior, and aggressiveness. Physiological: Increased 
heart rate and blood pressure, increased body temperature, dilated pupils, 
increased light sensitivity, constriction of peripheral blood vessels, rapid 
speech, dyskinesia, nausea, and vomiting. Late phase - Psychological: 
Dysphoria, depression, agitation, nervousness, drug craving, general CNS 
depression, fatigue, insomnia. Physiological: Itching/picking/scratching, 
normal heart rate, normal pupils. 
Side Effect Prof//e;Nervousness, restlessness, tremors, anxiety, and 
irritability. Chronic use may lead to personality changes, hyperactivity, 
psychosis, paranoia, and fear. Cocaine overdose can be characterized by 
agitation, enhanced reflexes, hostility, headache, tachycardia, irregular 
respiration, chills, nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, rise in body 
temperature, hallucinations, convulsions, delirium, unconsciousness, 
seizures, stroke, cerebral hemorrhage, heart failure, and death from 
respiratory failure. Cocaine excited delirium is a syndrome often caused by 
excessive cocaine use, and is associated with a dissociative state, violence 
to persons and property, exaggerated strength, hyperthermia, 
cardiorespiratory arrest and sudden death. 
Burnt lips and fingers from crack pipes are frequently seen, as are rashes 
and skin reddening from scratching. Smokers may suffer from acute 
respiratory problems including cough, shortness of breath, and severe chest 
pains with lung trauma and bleeding. Prolonged cocaine snorting can result 
in ulceration of the mucous membrane of the nose. The injecting drug user is 
at risk for transmitting or acquiring HIV infection/AIDS if needles or other 
injection equipment are shared. 
Duration of Effects: The faster the absorption the more intense and rapid 
the high, but the shorter the duration of action. Injecting cocaine produces an 
effect within 15-30 seconds. A hit of smoked crack produces an almost 
immediate intense experience and will typically produce effects lasting 5-15 
minutes. Similarly, snorting cocaine produces effects almost immediately and 
the resulting high may last 15-30 minutes. The effects onset more slowly 
after oral ingestion (-1 hour). General effects will persist for 1-2 hours 
depending on the dose and late phase effects following binge use may last 
several days. 
Tolerance, Dependence and Withdrawal Effects: Cocaine is a powerfully 
addictive drug of abuse and an appreciable initial tolerance to the euphoric 
high may develop. Cocaine is psychologically addicting, particularly with 
heavy or frequent use, and possibly physically addicting as well. The short 
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duration of effects is one reason leading to probability of addition. As effects 
wear off, more drug is frequently administered and a pattern of repeated use 
occurs. Following binge use of cocaine, the "crash" can last from 9 hours to 4 
days and may consist of agitation, depressed moods, insomnia to 
hypersomnolence, and initial drug craving. Withdrawal symptoms can 
typically last from 1-3 weeks and may consist of alternating low and high drug 
craving, low to high anxiety, paranoia, dysphoria, depression, apathy, 
irritability, disorientation, hunger, fatigue, bradycardia, and long periods of 
sleep. 
Drug Interactions: The combined use of cocaine and ethanol forms 
cocaethylene in the body, a substance which intensifies cocaine's euphoric 
effects while possibly increasing the risk of sudden death. In laboratory 
studies, cocaine has been shown to partially reverse some of the adverse 
effects of alcohol, but may contribute to the detrimental effects of marijuana. 
Performance Effects: Most laboratory-based studies have been limited by 
the low doses of cocaine that were allowed. At these single low doses, 
studies have shown performance enhancement in attentional abilities and 
increased behavioral and cortical arousal, but have no enhancement of 
effects on learning, memory, and other cognitive processes. Faster reaction 
times and diminished effects of fatigue have been observed. Improvements 
were greatest in behaviorally impaired subjects (e.g. sleep deprived, fatigued, 
or concurrent use of ethanol) and least improvements were observed in well-
rested, healthy subjects. More deleterious effects are expected after higher 
doses, chronic ingestion and during drug withdrawal, and include agitation, 
anxiety, distress, inability to focus on divided attention tasks, inability to follow 
directions, confusion, hostility, time distortion, and poor balance and 
coordination. Laboratory studies have also demonstrated increased risk 
taking (rapid braking or steering) and deleterious effects on vision related to 
mydriasis. Self-reported increases in sensitivity to light, seeing halos around 
bright objects, flashes or movement of light in peripheral field, difficulty 
focusing, blurred vision, and glare recovery problems have been reported. 
Effects on Driving: Observed signs of impairment in driving performance 
have included subjects speeding, losing control of their vehicle, causing 
collisions, turning in front of other vehicles, high-risk behavior, inattentive 
driving, and poor impulse control. As the effects of cocaine wear off subjects 
may suffer from fatigue, depression, sleepiness, and inattention. In 
epidemiology studies of driving under the influence cases, accidents, and 
fatally injured drivers, between 8-23% of subjects have had cocaine and/or 
metabolites detected in their blood. An examination of 253 fatally injured 
drivers in Wayne County, Michigan between 1996-1998, found that 10% of 
cases were positive for blood cocaine and/or metabolites. On review of 
accident and witness reports, aggressive driving (high speed and loss of 
vehicle control) was revealed as the most common finding. Ethanol was 
detected in 56% of these cases, and all of these drivers lost control of their 
vehicles. In Memphis, Tennessee in 1993, 13% of 150 drivers stopped for 
reckless driving were determined to be driving under the influence of cocaine 
based on observations of behavior and appearance, performance on field 
sobriety tests, and positive urine cocaine tests. 
A 25 year-old male driver, who made an improper turn against oncoming 
traffic, had a blood cocaine concentration of 0.04 mg/L and 0.06 mg/L of 
benzoylecgonine, 2 hours after the collision. A 30 year-old female caused an 
accident after failing to stop at a traffic light; the driver admitted to ingesting a 
large amount of cocaine - 2.5 hours prior to the collision, and 0.32 mg/L 
cocaine was detected in her blood 1 hour post accident. 
DEC Category: CNS stimulant. 
DEC Profile: Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze 
nystagmus not present; lack of convergence not present; pupil size dilated; 
reaction to light slow; pulse rate elevated; blood pressure elevated; body 
temperature elevated. Other characteristic indicators may include excessive 
activity, increased alertness, talkativeness, irritability, argumentativeness, 
nervousness, body tremors, anxiety, redness to nasal area and runny nose. 
Panel's Assessment of Driving Risks: Single low doses of cocaine may 
improve mental and motor performance in persons who are fatigued or sleep 
deprived, however, cocaine does not necessarily enhance the performance 
of otherwise normal individuals. Cocaine may enhance performance of 
simple tasks but not complex, divided-attention tasks such as driving. Most 
laboratory studies have been limited by the low single doses of cocaine 
administered to subjects. At these low doses, most studies showed 
performance enhancement in attentional abilities but no effect on cognitive 
abilities. Significant deleterious effects are expected after higher doses, 
chronic ingestion, and during the crash or withdrawal phase. 
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Morphine and heroin are white, crystalline powders. Illicit heroin may vary in 
color from white to dark brown due to impurities, or may appear as a black 
tar-like material. 
Synonyms: Morphine: Astramorph®, Duramorph®, Infumorph®, Kadian®, 
Morphine Sulfate®, MSIR®, MS-Contin®, Oramorph SR®, Roxanol®. 
Heroin: diacetylmorphine, diamorphine; Mexican brown or Mexican black tar 
heroin; bags, blue-steel, China white, H, horse, junk, no-name, silk, skag, 
smack. Scramble (cut heroin), bone (uncut heroin for smoking), chippers 
(occasional users). 
Source: Morphine is a naturally occurring substance extracted from the 
seedpod of the poppy plant, Papavar somniferum. The milky resin that seeps 
from incisions made in the unripe seedpod is dried and powdered to make 
opium, which contains a number of alkaloids including morphine. Morphine 
concentration in opium can range from 4-21%. An alternate method of 
harvesting morphine is by the industrial poppy straw process of extracting 
alkaloids from the mature dried plant, which produces a fine brownish 
powder. Morphine is a schedule II controlled substance and is available in a 
variety of prescription forms: injectables (0.5-25 mg/mL strength); oral 
solutions (2-20 mg/mL); immediate and controlled release tablets and 
capsules (15-200 mg); and suppositories (5-30 mg). Heroin is a schedule I 
controlled substance and is produced from morphine by acetylation at the 3 
and 6 positions. The majority of heroin sold in the U. S. originates from 
Southeast Asia, South America (Columbia) and Mexico. Low purity Mexican 
black tar heroin is most common on the West coast, while high purity 
Columbian heroin dominates in the East and most mid-western states. 
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Drug Class: Narcotic analgesic. 
Medical and Recreational Uses: Morphine is used medicinally for the relief 
of moderate to severe pain in both acute and chronic management. It can 
also be used to sedate a patient pre-operatively and to facilitate the induction 
of anesthesia. Heroin has no currently accepted medical uses in the U.S., 
however, it is an analgesic and antitussive. 
Potency, Purity and Dose: The dosage of morphine is patient-dependent. A 
usual adult oral dose of morphine is 60-120 mg daily in divided doses, or up 
to 400 mg daily in opioid tolerant patients. Recreationally, daily heroin doses 
of 5-1500 mg have been reported, with an average daily dose of 300-500 mg. 
Addicts may inject heroin 2-4 times per day. Depending on the demographic 
region, the street purity of heroin can range from 11-72% (average U.S. 
purity is -38%). Heroin may be cut with inert or toxic adulterants such as 
sugars, starch, powdered milk, quinine, and ketamine. Heroin is often mixed 
with methamphetamine or cocaine ("speedball") and injected; or co-
administered with alprazolam, MDMA (Ecstasy), crack cocaine, or 
diphenhydramine. 
Route of Administration: Morphine: oral, intramuscular, intravenous, rectal, 
epidural, and intrathecal administration. Morphine tablets may be crushed 
and injected, while opium can be smoked. Heroin: smoked, snorted, 
intravenous ("mainlining"), and subcutaneous ("skin popping") administration. 
Black tar heroin is typically dissolved, diluted and injected, while higher purity 
heroin is often snorted or smoked. 
Pharmacodynamics: Morphine produces its major effects on the CNS 
primarily through m-receptors, and also at k- and d-receptors. m 1-receptors 
are involved in pain modulation, analgesia, respiratory depression, miosis, 
euphoria, and decreased gastrointestinal activity; m 2-receptors are involved 
in respiratory depression, drowsiness, nausea, and mental clouding; k-
receptors are involved in analgesia, diuresis, sedation, dysphoria, mild 
respiratory depression, and miosis; and d-receptors are involved in 
analgesia, dysphoria, delusions, and hallucinations. Heroin has little affinity 
for opiate receptors and most of its pharmacology resides in its metabolism 
to active metabolites, namely 6-acetylmorphine, morphine, and morphine-6-
glucuronide. 
Pharmacokinetics: The oral bioavailability of morphine is 20-40%, and 35% 
is bound in plasma. Morphine has a short half-life of 1.5 - 7 hours and is 
primarily glucuroconjugated at positions 3 and 6, to morphine-3-glucuronide 
(M3G) and morphine-6-glucuronide (M6G), respectively. A small amount 
(5%) is demethylated to normorphine. M6G is an active metabolite with a 
higher potency than morphine, and can accumulate following chronic 
administration or in renally impaired individuals. The half-life of M6G is 4 +/-
1.5 hours. Close to 90% of a single morphine dose is eliminated in the 72 
hours urine, with 75% present as M3G and less than 10% as unchanged 
morphine. Heroin has an extremely rapid half-life of 2-6 minutes, and is 
metabolized to 
6-acetylmorphine and morphine. The half-life of 6-acetylmorphine is 6-25 
minutes. Both heroin and 6-acetylmorphine are more lipid soluble than 
morphine and enter the brain more readily. 
Molecular Interactions I Receptor Chemistry: The uridine 5-diphosphate-
glucuronosyltransferase (UGT) 2B7 isoform is primarily involved in the 
metabolism of morphine. Potential inhibitors of this UGT isoform could 
decrease the rate of morphine elimination if administered concurrently, while 
potential inducers could increase the rate of elimination. 
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio: Morphine 1.02; M6G 0.57; M3G 
0.59 
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations: Tolerance makes interpretation of 
blood or plasma morphine concentrations extremely difficult. Peak plasma 
morphine concentrations occur within an hour of oral administration, and 
within 5 minutes following intravenous injection. Average plasma 
concentrations of 0.065 mg/L are necessary for adequate therapeutic 
analgesia in ambulatory patients. Anesthetic concentrations can reach 
beyond 2 mg/L in surgical patients. Following oral doses of 10-80 mg, 
corresponding peak morphine concentrations in serum were 0.05-0.26 mg/L. 
Following an intravenous dose of 8.75g/70 kg, a peak serum concentration of 
0.44 mg/L was reached. In 10 intravenous drug fatalities, where morphine 
was the only drug detected, postmortem whole blood morphine 
concentrations averaged 0.70 mg/L (range 0.20-2.3 mg/L). Following a single 
12 mg intravenous mg dose of heroin, a peak heroin concentration of 0.141 
mg/L was obtained at 2 minutes, while the 6-acetylmorphine and morphine 
concentrations were 0.151 and 0.044, respectively. A single 5 mg 
intravenous dose of heroin produced a peak plasma morphine concentration 
of 0.035 mg/L at 25 minutes, while intravenous doses of 150-200 mg have 
produced plasma morphine concentrations of up to 0.3 mg/L. Intranasal 
administration of 12 mg heroin in 6 subjects produced average peak 
concentrations of 0.016 mg/L heroin in plasma within 5 minutes; 0.014 mg/L 
of 6-acetylmorphine at 0.08-0.17 hours; and 0.019 mg/L of morphine at 0.08-
1.5 hours. 
Interpretation of Urine Test Results: Positive morphine urine results 
generally indicate use within the last two to three days, or longer after 
prolonged use. Detection of 6-acetylmorphine in the urine is indicative of 
heroin use. High concentrations may indicate chronic use of the drug. It is 
important to hydrolyze urine specimens to assess a urine morphine 
concentration. 
Effects: Depends heavily on the dose of morphine or heroin, the route of 
administration, and previous exposure. Following an intravenous dose of 
heroin, the user generally feels an intense surge of euphoria ("rush") 
accompanied by a warm flushing of the skin, dry mouth, and heavy 
extremities. The user then alternates between a wakeful and drowsy state 
("on the nod"). 
Psychological: Euphoria, feeling of well-being, relaxation, drowsiness, 
sedation, lethargy, disconnectedness, self-absorption, mental clouding, and 
delirium. 
Physiological: Analgesia, depressed heart rate, respiratory depression, CNS 
depression, nausea and vomiting, reduced gastrointestinal motility, 
constipation, flushing of face and neck due to dilatation of subcutaneous 
blood vessels, cramping, sweating, pupils fixed and constricted, diminished 
reflexes, and depressed consciousness. 
Side Effect Profile: Drowsiness, inability to concentrate, apathy, lessened 
physical activity, constipation, urinary retention, nausea, vomiting, tremors, 
itching, bradycardia, severe respiratory depression, and pulmonary 
complications such as pneumonia. Medical complications among abusers 
arise primarily from adulterants found in street drugs and in non-sterile 
injecting practices, and may include skin, lung and brain abscesses, 
collapsed veins, endocarditis, hepatitis and HIV/AIDS. Overdose can include 
slow, shallow breathing, clammy skin, convulsions, extreme somnolence, 
severe respiratory depression, apnea, circulatory collapse, cardiac arrest, 
coma, and death. 
Duration of Effects: Depending on the morphine dose and the route of 
administration, onset of effects is within 15-60 minutes and effects may last 
4-6 hours. The duration of analgesia increases progressively with age 
although the degree of analgesia remains unchanged. Following heroin use, 
the intense euphoria lasts from 45 seconds to several minutes, peak effects 
last 1-2 hours, and the overall effects wear off in 3-5 hours, depending on 
dose. 
Tolerancet Dependence and Withdrawal Effects: Both morphine and 
heroin have high physical and psychological dependence. With regular use, 
tolerance develops early to the duration and intensity of euphoria and 
analgesia. Withdrawal symptoms may occur if use is abruptly stopped or 
reduced. Withdrawal can begin within 6-12 hours after the last dose and may 
last 5-10 days. Early symptoms include watery eyes, runny nose, yawning 
and sweating. Major withdrawal symptoms peak between 48-72 hours after 
the last dose and include drug craving, restlessness, irritability, dysphoria, 
loss of appetite, tremors, severe sneezing, diarrhea, nausea and vomiting, 
elevated heart rate and blood pressure, chills alternating with flushing and 
excessive sweating, goose-flesh, abdominal cramps, body aches, muscle 
and bone pain, muscle spasms, insomnia, and severe depression. 
Drug Interactions: Alcohol increases the CNS effects of morphine such as 
sedation, drowsiness, and decreased motor skills. There is a higher risk of 
respiratory depression, hypotension and profound sedation or coma with 
concurrent treatment or use of other CNS depressant drugs such as 
barbiturates, benzodiazepines, hypnotics, tricyclic antidepressants, general 
anesthetics, MAO inhibitors, and antihistamines. Morphine may enhance the 
neuromuscular blocking action of skeletal muscle relaxants and produce an 
increased degree of respiratory depression. Small doses of amphetamine 
substantially increase the analgesia and euphoriant effects of morphine and 
may decrease its sedative effects. Antidepressants may enhance morphine's 
analgesia. Partial agonists such as buprenorphine, nalbuphine, butorphanol, 
and pentazocine will precipitate morphine withdrawal. 
Performance Effects: Laboratory studies have shown that morphine may 
cause sedation and significant psychomotor impairment for up to 4 hours 
following a single dose in normal individuals. Early effects may include 
slowed reaction time, depressed consciousnessWhat is MMUCC MMUCC 
Committee MMUCC Documents What is MMUCC? The Model Minimum 
Uniform Crash Criteria (MMUCC) is a minimum set of crash data elements 
with standardized definitions that are relevant to injury control, highway and 
traffic safety. Not all of the MMUCC data elements need to be collected by 
police at the scene. Instead, some can be created from other data elements, 
such as the Vehicle Identification Number, to identify a specific vehicle 
characteristic. Or they can be obtained after linkage to other traffic records, 
such as injury or roadway inventory data to describe injury outcome or a 
specific roadway characteristic. FOR MORE INFORMATION ON THE 
MMUCC, PLEASE CLICK ON www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/departments/nrd-
30/ncsa/MMUCC.html Top of Page MMUCC Committee Acknowledgements 
The development of the Guideline for Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria 
(MMUCC) is being sponsored by the National Association of Governors' 
Highway Safety Representatives, the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration, and the Federal Highway Administration. Numerous state and 
local agencies and organizations have contributed staff to its development. 
The participation of the following individuals is recognized: Frank Carlile 
David Dickens Doug Donscheski Scott Falb Rosa Gill Dick Harmon Don Hillis 
David Kleppe David Lawrence Lance Mathess Creighton Miller David Mosley 
Phil Salzberg Manu Shah James Templeton Robert Thompson John Watson 
Ralph Craft Dennis Flemons Carl Hayden Janet Johnson Sandy Johnson 
Janet Kumer Tina Morgan Ed Milton Jack Oates Barbara Rhea Jackie Schraf 
David Sleet Carol Tan Esse Dennis Utter David Bozak Noel Bufe Charles 
Compton Barbara Harsha Roy Lucke Gary March Matt Snyder Richard Pain 
Charles Peltier Patricia Waller Florida Department of Transportation 
Charleston West Virginia Police Nebraska State Patrol Iowa Department of 
Transportation North Carolina State Division of Motor Vehicles Iowa Bureau 
of Emergency Medical Services Missouri Department of Transportation North 
Dakota State Highway Patrol Louisiana Office of Public Health Ohio State 
Patrol South Dakota Office of Accident Records Virginia Department of Motor 
Vehicles Washington Traffic Safety Commission Maryland State Highway 
Administration Texas Department of Public Safety Iowa Governor's Traffic 
Safety Bureau New York State Department of Transportation Federal 
Highway Administration National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
Federal Highway Administration National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration National Highway Traffic Safety Administration Federal 
Highway Administration National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration National Highway Traffic 
Safety Administration National Highway Traffic Safety Administration National 
Highway Traffic Safety Administration National Center for Injury Prevention 
and Control Federal Highway Administration National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration InfoGroup, Inc. Northwestern University Traffic Institute 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute National Association 
of Governors' Highway Safety Reps Northwestern University Traffic Institute 
March & Associates International Association of Chiefs of Police 
Transportation Research Board International Association of Chiefs of Police 
University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute Top of Page 
MMUCC Documents To visit the MMUCC Homepage, please click on the 
following link: Model Minimum Uniform Crash Criteria-Improving Crash Data 
for Safer Roadways The following links will take you to several documents 
related to the MMUCC effort. Download a PDF of the Final Guidelines 
(522KB) for Minimum Standardized Crash Data Reporting , sleepiness, and 
poor performance on divided attention and psychomotor tasks. Late effects 
may include inattentiveness, slowed reaction time, greater error rate in tests, 
poor concentration, distractibility, fatigue, and poor performance in 
psychomotor tests. Subjective feelings of sedation, sluggishness, fatigue, 
intoxication, and body sway have also been reported. Significant tolerance 
may develop making effects less pronounced in long-term users for the same 
dose. In a laboratory setting, heroin produced subjective feelings of sedation 
for up to 5-6 hours and slowed reaction times up to 4 hours, in former 
narcotic addicts. Euphoria and elation could also play a role on perception of 
risks and alteration of behaviors. 
Effects on Driving: The drug manufacturer states that morphine may impair 
the mental and/or physical abilities needed to perform potentially hazardous 
activities such as driving a car, and patients must be cautioned accordingly. 
Driving ability in cancer patients receiving long-term morphine analgesia 
(mean 209 mg daily) was considered not to be impaired by the sedative 
effects of morphine to an extent that accidents might occur. There were no 
significant differences between the morphine treated cancer patients and a 
control group in vigilance, concentration, motor reactions, or divided 
attention. A small but significant slowing of reaction time was observed at 3 
hours. In several driving under the influence case reports, where the subjects 
tested positive for morphine and/or 6-acetylmorphine, observations included 
slow driving, weaving, poor vehicle control, poor coordination, slow response 
to stimuli, delayed reactions, difficultly in following instructions, and falling 
asleep at the wheel. 
DEC Category: Narcotic Analgesic. 
DEC Profile: Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze 
nystagmus not present; lack of convergence not present; pupil size 
constricted; little or no reaction to light; pulse rate down; blood pressure 
down; body temperature down. Other characteristic indicators may include 
presence of fresh injection marks, track marks, flaccid muscle tone, droopy 
eyelids, drowsiness or "on-the-nod", and low raspy slow speech. 
Panel's Assessment of Driving Risks: Classification of risk depends on 
tolerance, dose, time of exposure, acute or chronic use, presence or absence 
of underlying pain, physiological status of individual, and the presence of 
other drugs. Moderately to severely impairing in non-tolerant individuals. Mild 
to moderately impairing if morphine is used as medication on a regular basis 
for chronic pain. Severely impairing in acute situations if used orally, or as an 
intravenous medication, or if either drug is taken illicitly. 
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Jechncal Report Docmenta'ion Methamphetamine hydrochloride is a white to light brown crystalline powder, 
P d 9 e or clear chunky crystals resembling ice. Methamphetamine base is a liquid. 
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Synonyms: Methamphetamine: chalk, chrissy, crank, crystal, glass, go, 
hydro, ice, meth, rock candy, speed, whiz; Desoxyn®; Amphetamine: 
dextroamphetamine; Dexedrine®, Adderall®, Benzedrine®, DextroStat®, 
Biphetamine®, Gradumet®. 
Source: The majority of street methamphetamine is produced in clandestine 
laboratories (e.g. reduction of/-ephedrine or d-pseudoephedrine over red 
phosphorus with hydroiodic acid, or reduction with sodium or lithium in 
condensed liquid ammonia). Methamphetamine remains concentrated in 
western U. S. states and some rural areas elsewhere. d-Methamphetamine is 
a schedule II controlled substance (Desoxyn®) available in 5 mg white, 10 
mg pink, and 15 mg yellow strength tablets. Amphetamine is also a Schedule 
II controlled substance and is usually supplied as the sulfate salt of the d-
isomer (Dexedrine®), or as the racemic mixture (Benzedrine®), or a mixture 
of the two (Adderall®). Dexedrine® is available in 5, 10, and 15 mg strength, 
orange/black capsules, or 5 mg tablets. Adderall® is available in 5, 7.5, 10, 
12.5, 20, and 30 mg strength, blue or orange tablets. 
Drug Class: CNS stimulant, sympathomimetic, appetite suppressant. 
Lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD; 
Methadone 




Morph«ne (and Heroin) 
Phencychdine (PCP) 
"o nene 
Zolpidem (and Zaleplor, 
Zopiclonc) 
Biographical Sketches of Lead 
Authors and Ma n Contr bt.tors 
Medical and Recreational Uses: Medicinally, methamphetamine is used in 
the treatment of narcolepsy, attention deficit disorder (ADD), and attention 
deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). Typical doses are 10 mg/day or up to 
40 mg daily, and a course of greater than six weeks is not recommended. 
Methamphetamine is infrequently used in the treatment of obesity, overeating 
disorders, and weight loss due to its abuse potential. Amphetamine is also 
used in ADD, narcolepsy, and weight control. Recreationally, 
methamphetamine is abused to increase alertness, relieve fatigue, control 
weight, treat mild depression, and for its intense euphoric effects. 
Potency, Purity and Dose: Purity of methamphetamine is currently very 
high, at 60-90%, and is predominantly d-methamphetamine which has 
greater CNS potency than the /-isomer or the racemic mixture. Common 
abused doses are 100-1000 mg/day, and up to 5000 mg/day in chronic binge 
use. Therapeutic doses of Desoxyn® are 2.5-10 mg daily, with dosing not 
exceed 60 mg/day. To treat narcolepsy, 5-60 mg/day of amphetamine is 
ingested in divided doses; and in ADD and ADHD doses of 2.5-10 mg/day is 
administered, depending on age. 
Route of Administration: Methamphetamine users often begin with 
intranasal or oral use and progress to intravenous use, and occasionally 
smoking. In contrast to cocaine, the hydrochloride salt of methamphetamine 
can itself be smoked. Methamphetamine is used sometimes with alcohol or 
marijuana, particularly during the withdrawal phase. 
Pharmacodynamics: Methamphetamine increases synaptic levels of the 
neurotransmitters dopamine, serotonin (5-HT) and norepinephrine, and has a 
and b adrenergic agonist effects. Norepinephrine is responsible for 
methamphetamine's alerting, anorectic, locomotor and sympathomimetic 
effects; dopamine stimulates locomotor effects, psychosis, and perception 
disturbances; and 5HT is responsible for delusions and psychosis. 
Methamphetamine's effects are similar to cocaine but its onset is slower and 
the duration is longer. Racemic amphetamine and d-amphetamine have 
similar chemical properties and actions to methamphetamine but are less 
potent. 
Pharmacokinetics: Following oral administration, peak methamphetamine 
concentrations are seen in 2.6-3.6 hours and the mean elimination half-life is 
10.1 hours (range 6.4-15 hours). The amphetamine metabolite peaks at 12 
hours. Following intravenous injection, the mean elimination half-life is 
slightly longer (12.2 hours). Methamphetamine is metabolized to 
amphetamine (active), p-OH-amphetamine and norephedrine (both inactive). 
Several other drugs are metabolized to amphetamine and methamphetamine 
and include benzphetamine, selegeline, and famprofazone. 
Molecular Interactions I Receptor Chemistry: Methamphetamine is 
metabolized to amphetamine via cytochrome P450 2D6. Potential inhibitors 
of the 2D6 isoenzyme could decrease the rate of methamphetamine 
elimination if administered concurrently, while potential inducers could 
increase the rate of elimination. 
Blood to Plasma Concentration Ratio: 0.65 (N=1). 
Interpretation of Blood Concentrations: Blood concentrations can 
generally be used to distinguish therapeutic use from abuse. Concentrations 
of 0.02-0.05 mg/L are typical for therapeutic use, and up to 0.2 mg/L have 
been documented. Concentrations greater than this represent abuse. 
Concentrations do not disclose phase of use. Normal concentrations in 
recreational use are 0.01 to 2.5 mg/L (median 0.6 mg/L). Concentrations 
above this range will likely be associated with severe, possibly life 
threatening, toxicity. There is no evidence for improved performance in any 
task or test following use of doses greater than 40 mg (or concentrations 
greater than 0.2 mg/L). 
Peak blood methamphetamine concentrations occur shortly after injection, a 
few minutes after smoking, and around 3 hours after oral dosing. Peak 
plasma amphetamine concentrations occur around 10 hours after 
methamphetamine use. 
Interpretation of Urine Test Results: Positive results generally indicate use 
within 1-4 days but could be up to a week following heavy chronic use. Rate 
of excretion into the urine is heavily influenced by urinary pH. Between 30-
54% of an oral dose is excreted in urine as unchanged methamphetamine 
and 10-23% as unchanged amphetamine. Following an intravenous dose, 
45% is excreted as unchanged parent drug and 7% amphetamine. 
Effects: Methamphetamine effects are less intense after oral ingestion than 
following smoked or intravenous use. Early phase - Psychological: Euphoria, 
excitation, exhilaration, rapid flight of ideas, increased libido, rapid speech, 
motor restlessness, hallucinations, delusions, psychosis, insomnia, reduced 
fatigue or drowsiness, increased alertness, heightened sense of well being, 
stereotypes behavior, feelings of increased physical strength, and poor 
impulse control. Early phase - Physiological: Increased heart rate, increased 
blood pressure, increased respiration rate, elevated temperature, 
palpitations, irregular heartbeat, dry mouth, abdominal cramps, appetite 
suppressed, twitching, pallor, dilated pupils, HGN at high doses, faster 
reaction time, increased strength, and more efficient glucose utilization. Late 
phase - Psychological: Dysphoria, residual stimulation, restlessness, 
agitation, nervousness, paranoia, violence, aggression, lack of coordination, 
pseudo-hallucinations, delusions, psychosis, and drug craving. 
Lafe phase - Physiological: Fatigue, sleepiness with sudden starts, 
itching/picking/scratching, normal heart rate, and normal to small pupils 
which are reactive to light. 
Binge use of methamphetamine can be broken down into the following 
phases: Rush - (5 minutes) intense euphoria, rapid flight of ideas, sexual 
stimulation, high energy, obsessive/compulsive activity, thought blending, 
dilated pupils; Shoulder-
(1 hour) less intense euphoria, hyperactivity, rapid flight of ideas, 
obsessive/compulsive activity, thought blending, dilated pupils; Binge use -
(1-5 days) the drug is frequently readministered in an attempt to regain or 
maintain euphoria; Tweaking - (4-24 hours) dysphoria, scattered and 
disorganized thought, intense craving, paranoia, anxiety and irritability, 
hypervigilance, auditory and tactile hallucinations, delusions, and normal 
pupils; Crash - (1-3 days) intense fatigue, uncontrollable sleepiness and 
catnapping, continuing stimulation, drug craving; Normal - (2-7 days) 
apparent return to "normalcy" although drug craving may appear; Withdrawal 
- anergia, anhedonia, waves of intense craving, depression, 
hypersomnolence, exhaustion, extreme fatigue. 
Side Effect Profile: Light sensitivity, irritability, insomnia, nervousness, 
headache, tremors, anxiety, suspiciousness, paranoia, aggressiveness, 
delusions, hallucinations, irrational behavior, and violence. In overdose, 
symptoms may include hyperthermia, tachycardia, severe hypertension, 
convulsions, chest pains, stroke, cardiovascular collapse, and possible 
death. Other common side effects following abuse of amphetamines include 
viral hepatitis, Sexually Transmitted Diseases (STDs), HIV, septicemia, 
abscesses, collapsed blood vessels, and malnutrition. Chronic abuse 
generally produces a psychosis that resembles schizophrenia and is 
characterized by paranoia, picking at the skin, preoccupation with one's own 
thoughts, and auditory and visual hallucinations. Violent and erratic behavior 
is frequently seen among chronic abusers. Over time, methamphetamine 
appears to cause reduced levels of dopamine, which can result in symptoms 
like those of Parkinson's disease. 
Duration of Effects: Onset of effects is rapid following intravenous use and 
smoking, while effects onset more slowly following oral use. Overall effects 
typically last 4-8 hours; residual effects can last up to 12 hours. 
Tolerance, Dependence and Withdrawal Effect: Methamphetamine has a 
high potential for abuse and dependence. Tolerance may develop and users 
may quickly become addicted and use it with increasing frequency and in 
increasing doses. Abrupt discontinuation of use can produce extreme fatigue, 
mental depression, apathy, long periods of sleep, irritability, and 
disorientation. 
Drug Interactions: Phenobarbital, propoxyphene, phenytoin and MAOI's 
slow the metabolism of amphetamines and increases their effect on the 
release of norepinephrine and other monoamines from adrenergic nerve 
endings. Amphetamines may counteract sedative effects of antihistamines. 
Methamphetamine may restore ethanol induced impairment in simple 
repetitive tasks of short duration, however, there is no restoration of ethanol-
induced deficits of balance and steadiness. In general, high doses of 
amphetamines are likely to increase the impairing effects of alcohol. 
Chlorpromazine and haloperidol block dopamine and norepinephrine 
reuptake, thus inhibiting the central stimulant effects of amphetamines. 
Amphetamine potentiates the analgesic effect of meperidine. 
Performance Effects: Laboratory studies have been limited to much lower 
doses than those used by methamphetamine abusers. Doses of 10-30 mg 
methamphetamine have shown to improve reaction time, relief fatigue, 
improve cognitive function testing, increase subjective feelings of alertness, 
increase time estimation, and increase euphoria. However, subjects were 
willing to make more high-risk choices. The majority of laboratory tests were 
administered 1 hour post dose. Expected performance effects following 
higher doses may include agitation, inability to focus attention on divided 
attention tasks, inattention, restlessness, motor excitation, increased reaction 
time, and time distortion, depressed reflexes, poor balance and coordination, 
and inability to follow directions. 
Effects on Driving: The drug manufacturer states that patients should be 
informed that methamphetamine and amphetamine may impair the ability to 
engage in potentially hazardous activities such as driving a motor vehicle. In 
epidemiology studies drive-off-the-road type accidents, high speed, failing to 
stop, diminished divided attention, inattentive driving, impatience, and high 
risk driving have been reported. Significant impairment of driving 
performance would also be expected during drug withdrawal. In a recent 
review of 101 driving under the influence cases, where methamphetamine 
was the only drug detected, blood concentrations ranged from <0.05-2.36 
mg/L (mean 0.35 mg/L, median 0.23 mg/L). Driving and driver behaviors 
included speeding, lane travel, erratic driving, accidents, nervousness, rapid 
and non-stop speech, unintelligible speech, disorientation, agitation, 
staggering and awkward movements, irrational or violent behavior, and 
unconsciousness. Impairment was attributed to distraction, disorientation, 
motor excitation, hyperactive reflexes, general cognitive impairment, or 
withdrawal, fatigue and hypersomnolence. 
DEC Category: CNS stimulant. 
DEC Profile: Horizontal gaze nystagmus not present; vertical gaze 
nystagmus not present; lack of convergence not present; pupil size dilated; 
reaction to light slow; pulse rate elevated; blood pressure elevated; body 
temperature normal to down. Other characteristic indicators may include 
restlessness, body tremors, talkativeness, exaggerated reflexes, anxiety, and 
track marks or recent injection sites. 
Panel's Assessment of Driving Risks: At lower dose, amphetamines have 
few effects on cognitive functioning and may result in an enhancement of 
some psychomotor tasks, but risk-taking increases at higher doses and 
responses become inappropriate. Drug withdrawal could also lead to the 
impairment of psychomotor skills required for safe driving. 
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